

PUBLIC SAFETY

INSECURITY HAS CHANGED OUR LIVES¹

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1. The globalisation of insecurity

In the last two decades, local concerns about public safety have been at the top of surveys as an issue that most worries public opinion. They have obtained the most spectacular publicity in the media and, therefore, have also received priority on political agendas.

Likewise, our tendency to always think about better solutions without even considering tackling the root causes of the problem in order to eliminate them (Panikkar, 2002) too often relegates analysing the problem and, therefore, understanding it. This occurs so often that, in practice, the 'problem of insecurity' has become one of the most used, if not the first, resources –without excluding the most brutal demagoguery– in political battles (for votes) and media battles (for audiences). A well-informed and clear debate is difficult, if not simply impossible, about the scope of the problem, its causes and, above all, the solutions that are really available. The effects of this unjustifiable shortcoming, far from representing a simple technical anomaly, take on colossal political relevance.

Whether it is the result of the existence of important interests –business, political and economic– directly connected to sustained levels of insecurity or the consequence of the psychosocial predisposition to offload diffuse and accrued anxieties onto a visible, local and easily-accessible object (the scapegoat mechanism) or even more probably, as the perverse synergy of both factors –namely, the conjunction between the interests created in insecurity and the psychosocial need to offload accumulated anxiety– the matter is that the problem of insecurity represents a poorly-formulated problem and poorly-formulated problems, as we know, do not have solutions. Thus, forewarning that we are facing a poorly-formulated problem becomes the prior condition that is absolutely essential for finding an exit from this authentic dead-end street.

In my understanding, there are two main reasons that explain this absurdity.

Firstly, the problem of insecurity is built –due to the state's lack of economic and social commitment (Wacquant, 2006)– breaking off a specific chunk of concerns about safety (insecurity, materialised locally) from the rest (insecurity, which is generated globally). Secondly, the formulation of the problem of insecurity is based on confusion between the objective dimension (the probability of being a victim of personal attack) and the subjective dimension (the widespread fear of crime). Thus, almost without a need to distinguish between real risk and perceived risk –which, despite their clear interconnection, are actually very different–, demands for security (citizens' request for either public or private protection services) rest on a diffuse fear of crime that, despite containing the real risk of being a victim of an attack, takes on its own life, completely separate from the real development of crime indexes.

1.1 Between risk and fear

Without a real increase in criminal activity, the perception of insecurity does not seem to significantly increase. After victimisation increases the feeling of vulnerability, this insecurity acquires an independent and differentiated dynamic in which many more elements may come into play than solely the real spreading of crime. Thus, proper understanding of the phenomenon of insecurity requires that we keep in mind that:

'After consolidated, this world view does not change quickly. It is not affected by the changes that occur year after year in crime rates, even when they entail drops in the real rates of criminal victimisation. This explains the apparent absence of a relationship between crime trends and feelings of fear about crime. Our attitudes towards crime –our fears and bitterness, but also our narratives and typical ways of understanding using common sense– become cultural events that are upheld and reproduced by cultural scripts and not by criminological research or official empirical data' (Garland, 2005).

It is not strange then that those who most experience this feeling of insecurity are not necessarily those social sectors that are genuinely most directly exposed to real risks of personal attack, but rather those that do not have either the resources or the life expectancy to adapt to the vertiginous economic, social and

cultural changes that are shaking the so-called age of globalisation. This is explained because in the shaping of this feeling of insecurity, there are other fears mixed in with the widespread fears of crime (typical, in short, of insecurity) that have nothing to do with real risk to personal security.

In any case, the endurance of this climate of uncertainty associated with the existence of high crime levels seems to reflect –in citizens' eyes– either a lack of desire to confront the problem or, worse still, an inability to do so. The spreading of the signs of social disorder lead individuals to feel at risk (real or perceived) in the region where they live and to even take specific measures to protect it. At this point, there seems to be a dual adaptation mechanism: on the one hand, the social sectors that have the resources to do so leave the places that threaten to enter into the spiral of social disorder and urban decline (Skogan, 1992); on the other, among the sectors that don't have this ability, the growth of feelings of insecurity feeds not only complaints but also punitive attitudes and reactions.

Despite this, the demand for security represents a social issue that cannot, in the end, be reduced to the simple aggregation of individual or group experiences. It therefore requires a political response –in the context of integrated management of cities and their dysfunctions– that can transcend merely technical and repressive responses (Chalom and Léonard, 2001).

At this point, everything points to demands for security in our society being shaped by the perceived risk of crime as an undifferentiated whole –more than on the basis of the real risk of being a victim of a specific type of attack– primarily by part of the sector that is threatened by economic marginalisation, as well as social, cultural, political and ideological marginalisation.

This explains why public policies are mainly focused on responding to demands for security from a fearful public (safety policies), instead of on deactivating the different conflicts that are the source of the different manifestations of crime (social policies). Thus, the vicious circle is complete: unleashed conflicts that generate precariousness in the most vulnerable social sectors; demands for security that

respond to perceived risk before real risk; safety policies that aim to give a fearful public peace of mind without changing the conditions that produce these fears; and, consequently, chronic insecurity .

1.2 Reformulating public safety

The study of the feeling of insecurity (perceived risk) is essential for correctly understanding the phenomenon of insecurity and, therefore, the social structure and the territory establish two basic dimensions, as they have an impact on the unequal distribution of this subjective side of the phenomenon among the public (Curbet et al, 2007).

With regard to social structure, as we have seen, the construction of the phenomenon of insecurity is not only related to the real risk the public experiences of being a victim of crime, but instead depends on many other factors. Among the risk factors, one of the most important is individuals' social positions. This makes them more or less vulnerable to social insecurity. The need for public safety sharpens among those groups with a more vulnerable social status, who experience a greater feeling of insecurity in all areas of life and have fewer resources to confront these risks. Conversely, people equipped with greater protection concede less importance to public safety. This is that sector of the population who enjoy a competitive position in the global economy, are politically integrated, are able to deploy new forms of social relationships and who are aware that they have sufficient resources to control risks.

With respect to the territory, cities and their neighbourhoods are much more than simple urban structures. They are the arena where citizens' social relationships develop, where the positive and negative aspects of coexistence materialise and where the public's fears and safeties are shaped. The perception of insecurity in neighbourhoods tends to be less than in the city. This is because neighbourhoods are close to us and known, while the city is seen as more distant and unknown. The two main arguments that confer security or insecurity to a space are the place itself and the people who frequent it. Both factors translate into a single variable: the social use of the space, a basic element to explain the risk perceived in different territories.

Another factor that may have an impact on perceiving insecurity in public spaces is incivility. This is because the structure of relations and coexistence in neighbourhoods is one of the privileged spheres for researching securities. Furthermore, incivility is a factor that comes into play in perceiving insecurity due to the deterioration of public spaces that is normally entailed. However, the problem of incivility could end up

becoming the scapegoat for a much larger and more disturbing problem: insecurity.

In any case, the problem of insecurity cannot be disassociated from the generalised absence of reliable indicators that make it possible to dimension the different forms of crime correctly, to continue to compare their evolution in different cities, countries and regions and, finally, to measure the real impact of different safety policies. Thus, the need to have reliable indicators on the development of crime and insecurity, more than an exclusively methodological challenge, has become a top political requirement.

As Torrente (2007) describes, there are currently three sources of information for properly understanding the risks to public safety that affect a community: the controllers (police, courts, inspectors, etc.), the victims and the offenders. Clearly, the controllers provide data exclusively related to the problems they manage, which is normally data on the infractions and crimes they process. Victims can relate their experiences, their fears and their safety and security demands. They therefore provide a wide range of data on how unsafety is experienced. Finally, the violators and criminals can talk about their activities, outlooks and intentions. Naturally, these are just the transgressions and crimes that we know about. Different techniques can be used to gather data from each group. The most common include police and legal statistics, victimisation surveys and self-incrimination surveys.

Since they measure different things, each of the sources and techniques employed has its limitations. More than half of penal crimes are not reported and sentences may not even represent 8% of the reports filed. Furthermore, police statistics tend to over-represent 'street crimes' committed by youth, men and low social classes, in detriment to 'white collar' crimes. In turn, it is hard for victimisation surveys to capture events with group victims, such as environmental crimes or those committed by organisations and professions. Finally, self-incrimination surveys have serious problems with no responses. As a whole, the different sources tend to over-represent the infractions and crimes committed on public streets and to under-represent other types of crime. Thus, there is really no ideal source or technique for evaluating public safety. This is so true that sociologists and criminologists tend to use different sources in these analyses. Even with the aforesaid limitations, victimisation surveys are the technique that provides a vision that is closest to the general public's reality, so that they tend to be used as a base for subjective insecurity indicators, namely, to measure perceived risk.

An added difficulty in analysing insecurity rests not only in the lack of suitable indicators, but also in their own limitations. As selecting them always implies a choice, they cannot be exempt from theoretical and political controversies.

Despite all these limitations, which are, moreover, inevitable, we must understand that the priority task consists of reformulating the problem of insecurity (associated exclusively with the danger of street crime) in the context of global social insecurity, in terms that make it possible to deal with it without costs that are unsustainable for freedom and justice.

2. The governance of public safety

The selection and implementation of technically-viable policies and practices (namely, executable ones) and politically sustainable ones (socially acceptable) presupposes the existence of certain social, political and cultural conditions for their realisation. The interaction, inevitably paradoxical, between the freedom of individual and responsible action by the players and the decisive influence of social, political and cultural conditions is inescapable.

In the last quarter of the 20th century in industrialised societies, the field of crime control and criminal justice underwent –if not a complete collapse or break– a crisis that rattled some of its basic mainstays (danger) and gave rise to a series of adaptable responses whose effects have made it into the modern day (opportunity). According to Garland, this is when the social and criminological scenario was shaped in which our new public policies must be deployed. It was marked, especially in the last third of the 20th century, by two fundamental social events: the standardisation of high crime levels and the recognised limitations of state criminal justice. Jointly, they gave rise to a third event that is just as important: the erosion of the myth –a founding principle of modern states– according to which sovereign states are able to generate law and order and control crime within their territorial limits.

At the beginning of the 90s, when the progression of crime rates that started in the 60s in industrialised societies seemed to have reached a plateau, the crime rates against property and violent crimes recorded were 10 times higher than 40 years earlier. However, don't forget that the rates in the years after World War Two were already double or triple those registered in the period between wars. Thus, between the 1960s and 1990s, a series of phenomena developed around crime: increased and widespread fear of crime, routine behaviour to prevent it, omnipresent and generalised cultural and media 'awareness of crime'. People no longer considered high crime rates

as a temporary disaster and started to deem it a normal risk that had to be constantly kept in mind. Thus, firstly, the contemporary experience of crime is set forth –based on a new fearful awareness of the inevitability of high crime rates– in a series of cultural assumptions and group representations that not even a drop in crime rates seems able to change.

Intimately connected to the standardisation of high crime rates, and practically in parallel, a second determining event occurred in the shaping of the contemporary experience of crime: the recognised limits of state criminal justice. Until the end of the 1960s, criminal justice institutions seemed capable of suitably resolving the challenges posed by the sustained increase in registered crime rates. However, in the 1980s and the beginning of the 90s, a clear feeling of failure in criminal justice agencies was seen and an increasingly explicit recognition of the state's limitations in controlling crime.

This outlook, somewhat buried in official circles, became much more strident in public opinion that forthrightly stated their critical position about criminal justice (particularly the actions of courts and judges). They were accused of passing down sentences that were too indulgent and not concerned enough about public safety. In this climate of mistrust about the ability of criminal justice, public policies deem it more realistic to confront the effects of crime than to tackle the problem itself.

2.1 The crisis of state crime control

This leads us to expect a collision between these two facts –standard high crime rates and recognised limitations of the state criminal justice system– to realise that ‘the king has no clothes’. The state's capacity to duly comply with its aim to govern different aspects of social life was questioned on several fronts. However, the structural depth of this inability had yet to be unveiled. Neither temporary nor partial, the lack of expertise to generate the expected levels of crime control made the magnitude of state failure blatantly clear.

The erosion of the state's ability to impose law and order and control crime within its borders undoubtedly represents a truth that is extremely difficult for government authorities to take on. They are aware of the enormous costs that would be entailed in abandoning their pretension of being the exclusive providers of public safety. The flip side of acknowledging the dangers is the failure of institutions, which would have to be justified by the lack of dangers (Beck, 2008).

However, in reality trust in public power to control crime is –as Robert (2003) reminds us– a relatively recent

invention, and even more so in social practices than in the dialogues of state lawyers. It is no surprise then that this is a fragile trust that needs very little to erode it. And no excessive sensitivity is needed to perceive, under the fine layer of the contemporary criminal system, the persistent ancestral beating of fear, power, violence and revenge.

Thus, the slow, difficult march forward of the pace of humanitarian reforms in the field of crime control and criminal justice should be no surprise. Conversely, the apparent ease with which we return to punitive principles and strategies that, to enlightened souls, may have seemed definitively ended in a bygone age.

For the purposes of identifying the changes that have occurred in controlling crime, Garland (2005) suggests taking two sets of transformative forces into account. Firstly, the social, economic and cultural changes that characterise late modernity. These changes were experienced unequally by all Western industrialised democracies after World War Two and, more sharply, starting in the 1960s. Secondly, the combination of economic neo-liberalism and social conservatism guided the public policies unleashed in response to these changes and, likewise, responded to the crisis of the welfare State.

Following Garland, it became clear that the changes that happened in the field of crime control and criminal justice during the last half of the 20th century are certainly due to the combined actions of political decision taking, designers of public policies, criminologists and opinion shapers. However, these are only explained by also considering –as an essential condition– the changes made in social structure and the cultural sensitivities that made these types of public policies both possible (technically) and desirable (by the sectors most influenced by the electorate).

Certainly, in the change of millennium, the endurance of the structural elements typical of capitalist and democratic modernity and the unfolding of deep transformations in economic, political, social and cultural arenas have both converged. They have affected the global economic markets and the national state systems and even the basic conditions that govern the lives of individuals and families. These changes, both due to their scope and their intensity, could not help but substantially alter the area of crime control and criminal justice.

In any case, whatever the result may be, the action of criminal justice is condemned, due to its very nature, to generating dislike and, at times, disillusion and even frank hostility in some of the parties involved in the process. For example, measures must be taken about dangerous individuals, and

criminals must even be released that are reincorporated into communities after their sentences have been served. Under these conditions, the different players watch each other mistrustfully and are generally sceptical about the overall efficacy of the criminal justice system. Thus, it is not strange that the state device for controlling crime continues is viewed more as part of the problem of insecurity than a solution by a large part of the population (Garland, 2005).

2.2 Tension between politicians and administrators

In no case can this be seen to justify a determinist reduction of the options available –both to the agencies and the authorities in the criminal justice system– for responding to these aforesaid changes and, thus, for deploying significantly different strategies. The leading role and, thus, the responsibility of the players in the changes that occurred in crime control and criminal justice in this last half century are unquestionable in resolving problems that were successively posed.

The governments have deployed two broad strategies that are schizophrenically aimed at opposing objectives. On the one hand, they promote institutional reforms and public policies addressed, in one way or another, at surpassing the proven limits of criminal justice and making the community co-responsible for the preventive control of crime (communitarian strategy). On the other, the elected government employees –faced with difficulties in adapting public policies to an inconvenient reality– frequently react in a politicising way, either by denying the evidence and reconfirming the state myth of exclusive state control of crime or by signing up for law and order formulas from electoral results, which are tempting but have unpredictable social results (punitive populism).

The increase and chronification of the registered high crime rates starting in the 1960s certainly significantly alarmed the main criminal justice agencies (the police, courts, prisons). The shrinking resources to confront increased demand must be added to the increased workloads of the criminal justice system (crimes reported to the police, investigations done, trials held, imprisoned criminals). As seen, criminal justice started to be viewed as part of the problem, more than as part of the solution. The anxiety caused by fear of losing the public's trust also caused different, and not always complementary, reactions in the two principal groups of institutional players: the politicians and the administrators.

For political players, moving in the electoral competence setting, political decisions are strongly conditioned by the requirement to adopt effective short-term measures, which are popular and are not interpreted by public opinion

as showing weakness or neglecting state responsibilities. Thus, political decisions in the area of crime control and insecurity inevitably tend to seek over-the-top showiness, when not simple sensationalism, and to avoid being accused of not being in touch with 'common sense' at any price, by either the political opposition or the media (Garland, 2005).

Conversely, for administrative players, in charge of managing the agencies of the criminal justice system, the demands typical of public relations and the political arena are also important and act as external constraints in taking decisions, although these are not essential considerations in the day to day work governing administrators' decision taking. Despite having to obey the laws and directives enacted by politicians, the latter group is viewed by administrators as an external and problematic force, with other interests and agendas, more than as an integrating part of the organisation.

Thus, in this setting of growing pressure in the criminal justice system, a conflictive relationship is shaped between politicians –accustomed to considering public policy proposals depending on their political allure and with respect to other political positions– and administrators – obligated to focus on the interests typical of the organisation they are running. This makes the existence clear of two dialogues based on different versions of the crisis of crime control, as well as the reasoning, interests and strategies that are hard to reconcile, making it extremely difficult to draft effective public policies.

This structural tension between politicians and administrators is particularly visible, with particular virulence, when crisis situations, on the one hand, put people under immense pressure and cause emotional reactions and, on the other, flood organisational designs of the agencies that are called to confront the different types of crisis. This may be the case with the police, fire-fighters or the army (Boin, 2007). This may be even truer in a field of governability so replete with conflicts as the criminal justice system. Cases must be handled every day with high public visibility and emotional stress that put the state capacity to uphold order to the test.

2.3 Public opinion and the media

This new scenario has not only altered the agreed roles of institutional players (politicians and administrators) and, in particular, the police, but has also granted a leading role to a varied group of new players, previously inconceivable in the field of crime control. As Roché (2004) stressed, this has gone so far that the possible coordination of these different levels of administration and the new players are one of the crucial aspects of the governance of public safety.

As we saw, the combined effect of the standardisation of high crime rates and the recognised limitations of state criminal justice explains the crisis in state crime control. This has impacted not only the criminal justice agencies, but has also naturally and deeply impacted public opinion.

It is not only about the loss of trust in the state's power to effectively control crime but, beyond an intense yet fleeting bad mood, in the shaping of a new 'common sense', particularly upheld in the middle classes, emotionally identified with the victims of crime, belligerent against offenders' rights and deeply critical of the actions of criminal justice.

However, don't forget that 'common sense' attitudes are too often characterised by a totalitarian outlook that seeks refuge in an explosive blend of frivolous suppositions and ideological dogmas. These converge in a rigid demand for justice and punishment –in reality nothing more than vengeance– as well as protection at any price.

Outlined in this way, the problem of insecurity clearly has no solution. Crushed by their own weight, the simultaneous application of each and every one of these absolute principles becomes simply and totally impossible. This can be understood even better when these inflexible demands are compared to the limited resources made available to criminal justice, the legal requirements for proof, the action capacity of the defence and the possibilities of making deals about the sentence. It is therefore not easy to stop the general public from being frequently incapable of understanding criminal justice decisions that, in many of these cases, scandalise them.

However, when referring to public opinion in the information age, we must take the complex yet important role into account that is exercised by the mass media and, above all, television –established as a central institution of modernity in the second half of the 20th century– in shaping contemporary common sense, related to crime control and criminal justice contained in public opinion.

The influence of the media on insecurity is the object of a debate that shows no signs of being close to reaching a satisfactory conclusion. On the one hand, there are no elements that allow the theory to be fundamentally upheld that reduces public opinion practically to a mere media creation. At the other extreme, media participation, in shaping popular perceptions about crime, cannot be limited to a simple function of mirroring reality. Not so much or so little. And, probably, a bit of each of these attributes that are so roundly attributed to the media, but to a just degree.

Above all, we can't forget that the mass media, in a media society, are positioned

on dual and complementary spheres of power: economic (they are increasingly part of large sales corporations – progressively transnational– that fight fiercely, in the information and entertainment market, to obtain maximum profits by exploiting the maximum audiences) and political (they need political power that is essential for their survival). In other words, just in case any doubt remained, communication media does not exactly represent what it seems to literally announce by its name: a simple means (without any self-interest) that would be limited to informing about –as they like to proclaim– 'what is happening' without adding anything or taking anything away.

This essay is not the place to consider the legitimacy of self-interests (commercial and political) that the mass communication media can defend in each case, particularly television. Even less can we turn to the always seductive 'conspiracy theory' in order to close the door on the complex role played by the media in shaping 'common sense' on crime control with a simple explanation. It must be pointed out that, in the increasingly competitive market of info-entertainment, it is not about attending to material needs but psychological ones and, therefore, the challenge consists of offering media products aimed at satisfying desires and channelling fears. And if it is about satisfying desires and fears, then the raw material of communicational business, particularly in its audiovisual variant, can be no other than a constant succession of new features (overwhelming, surprising, thrilling, disturbing and, even more, terrifying) at any price (Gil Calvo, 2006).

There is no need to repeat a clear fact here: the communication media do not cause high crime rates or erode trust in the state ability to control crime. However, there is absolutely no need to be limited to simply stating this. To Margaret Thatcher 'society does not exist' and, conversely, many sociologists believe –in an 'inverted Thatcherism'– that nothing exists that is not society (Beck, 2008). 'Common sense' on crime control is, in the end, a psycho-social construction, namely, a process by which an individual, in interaction with many others, forms or adheres to a specific view about how crime control and criminal justice work. And in modern-day society, the process for shaping this 'common sense' includes the media as an indispensable factor. Lagrange (Robert, 2003) formulates this in suggestively balanced terms: the media reflects worries that it has not created, crystallisation points about emblematic violent acts and their influence on the perception of insecurity among citizens only arises when there is consonance between the reader's or viewer's experience and the media message.

A dual specific impact must be added to the shaping of contemporary 'common sense' with regard to crime control and criminal justice in the media revolution that, starting in the 1960s, changed social relations and cultural sensibilities, which was led at first by the mass-circulation newspapers, then by radio and finally by television. The global success of mass media and the consequent cosmopolitan perspective made the limits of the local information markets explode that had previously been kept fragmented and relatively stagnant –centred on specific ethnic, social and cultural realities– and, with this, it brought risks and specific problems home to everybody that before had been quite isolated and could not feed a widespread and global insecurity. In the territorially indiscriminate depiction of crime at a global level –through mass communication media– we can all feel exposed not only to real risks that correspond to local criminal activity, but also to perceived risks that are nourished from undifferentiated narration, through global media, of problems that affect social groups and territories that are very different from each other.

This homogenisation of the communicational space not only facilitates global propagation –beyond local and direct shared experience– of widespread insecurity (the perception that we can all be victims of any crime), de-territorialised (the perception that anything can happen anywhere) and, thus, disturbing (the perception that even the most aberrant crimes are the problem of everybody). Television becomes the showcase that shows everybody new lifestyles and the corresponding consumption patterns that at the hour of truth, in the real access possibilities, are limited exclusively to a restricted social sector. This has the corresponding perturbing effect for broad sectors of the public who see themselves as trapped in the cruel mixed signal that biologist Jean Rostand [1986] attributes to false liberalism: *'Leave all the doors open, but fiercely prohibit them from entering'*.

3. Conclusion

Insecurity is not group neurosis, as some claim. Neither does it necessarily correspond to a constant and omnipresent increase of all criminal acts. Not so much or so little.

There is a crucial fact that has spotlighted the insecurities of contemporary society: the explosion in the last 30 years of the misnamed petty crime, namely, thefts and robberies, as well as personal assaults. This reality, which doesn't seem easy to elude, explains a good part of the fear of crime that has become one of the main citizen concerns and, even more, has remained there so tenaciously.

The persistent resistance of authorities and the police to accept this clear

fact seems much more surprising: crime against property and people has increased practically at the same pace as the mass-consumption society has unfolded and, in particular, personal assets of great economic and symbolic value (i.e. iPhones, mobile phones, laptops, automobile accessories, etc.). This pace has been exponential.

At the other extreme, the prosperous private security industry constantly turns to alarmist, albeit effective, marketing: save yourself if you can! (In other words, whoever has the resources needed to pay for individual protection). And meanwhile, the media has not delayed in discovering the dramatic and spectacular nature of crime. It has clearly taken on a growing protagonism in the global info-entertainment industry.

At this point, it is practically unavoidable to mention an obvious fact: *What would be left of supply (both of the private security industry and the communication media) without the existence of demand (not just latent but active) for security, if not at almost any price (both in economic terms and in terms of loss of freedom)?* You may ask yourself, who doesn't see how many indignities we are still willing to accept, for example, when walking through airport security controls.

It may be more balanced to adopt the most integral vision possible of the phenomenon of insecurity that evades the Manichaeism and simplifying temptation from which no-one is exempt. Asking ourselves some pertinent questions may help us.

What came first, the egg (the demand for safety and security) or the chicken (the supply of security and safety)? We know that one would be nothing without the other. Thus, by understanding one of them, we not only understand the other but, even more importantly, we see the whole in their complete web of operation.

Also, *what dimension is more relevant in the phenomenon of insecurity: objective (crime) or subjective (fear of crime)?* Without high crime levels, it would be difficult to obtain equally high levels of fear of crime. This is clear, although victimisation surveys also tell us that after the generic fear of crime is shaped (that doesn't specify being the victim of a clear and immediate crime), it does not evolve in parallel to criminal reality. This means that crime may drop at a certain time and in a certain place, but this does not lead to the corresponding and automatic decrease of the fear associated with crime. And vice-versa, clearly.

This could lead us to pose a third question: *Is insecurity made up exclusively of fear of crime or does it catalyse other fears that might have no other outlet through which we can express them?* Global uncertainties and

insecurities typical of our era are colossal (climate change, need we say more?) and widespread (it seems like it affects others right now or still hasn't appeared in its most extreme nature) and in many cases locally perceived as remote in time and/or space (that doesn't happen here!). Totally conversely, thieves and offenders are perfectly identifiable figures, individual and pursuable. They can be brought to justice and, ultimately, can be punished. Furthermore, a robbery or attack is a concrete, tangible, imaginable and provable action that can be recorded and handled statistically. What a difference from this throng of diffuse risks, for which we have nothing more than debatable signs, despite everything or maybe because of it, we arrive at the source not always aware of contemporary uncertainty and insecurity! Insecurity seems to be invented to facilitate the essential crystallisation of a specific, close and visible object of this throng of uncertainties and insecurities that so seriously threaten social cohesion.

In the risk society, the demand for public safety is configured more as based on the perception of insecurity existing in public opinion than in criminal reality. This explains how governments generally react sporadically to the outbursts of fear about crime, instead of responding in a well-reasoned and reasonable way to the development of crime. Here is the apparent paradox. On the one hand, institutional reforms and public policies are promoted that are aimed, in one way or another, at surpassing the proven limits of criminal justice and making the community co-responsible in crime prevention control (communitarian strategy) and, on the other, elected government employees –faced with difficulties in adapting public policies to the inconvenient reality– often react by politicising, either by denying evidence and re-affirming the state myth of exclusive state control of crime or by signing up to law and order formulas based on tempting electoral results, but with unpredictable social effects (punitive populism).

This fact would explain the coincidence between public opinion, the media and government authorities in the lack of appreciation stated for the analysis of the causes that would notify on the origin of the different criminal manifestations and, consequently, also the scarce attention paid to the need of having more reliable indicators than we now have. All together, they inevitably lead us to persist with public policies for public safety based more on the often incomprehensible variations in public opinion instead of on reliable and updated knowledge about the evolution of crime. Despite knowing the limitations well and even the costs and contraindications, we keep on waiting to react instead of preventively anticipating via prudent behaviours which could possibly let us minimise the risks of criminal victimisation.

Persisting with this erratic behaviour, marked more by variations in the insecurity manifested by public opinion and not in criminal reality, does not sketch a hopeful horizon for essential safety and, totally conversely, opens up new questions that end up questioning the nature of public good that we have seen suitable to attribute to safety. *Shouldn't safety be transformed into a good that is bought instead of a service that we expect from the public administrations?*, asks Ulrich Beck. In any case, the apparently consistent barriers between public and private safety do seem to have hastily faded away.

1 A very extensive version of this article can be found at Curbet, J. (2010). *El rei nu: Una anàlisi de la (in)seguretat ciutadana*.

MANAGING PUBLIC SAFETY

POLICIES ON PUBLIC SECURITY¹

Francesc Guillén Lasierra

1. The public security system. The need for political decisions that define a system with interdisciplinary ramifications

Public security was always considered a field that was reserved for the police, who were responsible for guaranteeing it. The criminal justice system was also attributed some functions in this field: sentencing criminals and dissuading those who had not yet gone along this path. Thus, the criminal code, justice and the police all had to guarantee different areas of public security. Indeed, the concept has not always historically been the same. In other eras, we spoke more of upholding the socio-political status quo and public order, rather than of public security. However, we will not enter these polemics, which have already been sufficiently handled and studied².

It has been several decades since the first research projects on security with minimum thoroughness were carried out. They put on the table that security was something more than simply combating crime, as citizens' perception of security was not also correlated with crime indexes (the first victimisation surveys clearly revealed this³). On the other hand, other equally-reliable research has posed that there are social, environmental and individual factors that make committing criminal activities more or less difficult⁴. Both in the first case (perception of security/insecurity) and the second (factors that have an impact on crime), it seemed clear that the police and the criminal justice system were not enough players to tackle the challenge of public

security with guaranteed success. The second half of the 20th century provided paradigmatic examples of this shortage, because crime increased in line with the increased numbers of police and justice administration (paradigmatically in the 80s)⁵. Recently, we have been verifying that an increased number of inmates in prison does not lead to a reduction in statistics on criminal activities⁶.

This feeling of failure was accentuated by the appearance of zones, of neighbourhoods, where public security operators had lost control of the situation. These are regions where the police can't even enter with minimum guarantees of security. They are frequently areas and spaces where people and groups congregate in extremely disadvantaged economic and social situations, often originating from foreign emigration, varying from country to country. France speaks of the population from the Maghreb, while Germany has a large Turkish population and the United States has its Hispanic population. Those are zones that have suffered a marginalisation process that can even cause the appearance of serious public order problems like what happened in France in 2005. But this is not the only setting where we find spirals of tension and unrest that lead to areas that the state is unable to control. Political and institutional crises accompanied by populist policies have also had tragic consequences in this direction. At this time, there are countries such as, for example, Venezuela, that have entered into a negative spiral in which express kidnappings and murders are the order of the day, with figures exceeding a hundred deaths per week due to this type of crimes. The police not only cannot confront this type of problem, but are the victims in many cases, particularly because some of their members are pressured and influenced by criminal networks (if they do not directly form part of them). Anyway the state is losing the battle in those spaces.

The end of the 20th century coincided with the consolidation of a trend to change in our societies. The growing internationalisation of the large problems and their hypothetical solutions, as well as the growing mobility of the population, the risks of post-industrialisation, the reappearance of organised political violence that is increasingly global, the periodic appearance of economic crises, the endurance of climate change, which is causing large-scale disasters (floods, underwater quakes, etc.) have all greatly expanded the scope of security and led to the appearance of the concept of risk society⁷. This concept has nothing to do with crime. It starts from the premise that our societies (and their citizens) are subjected to a large number of risks to both their people and heritage. It is the function of public powers to manage this risk in order to keep it within the limits

that can be assumed by the population. Current victimisation and security surveys have revealed that when citizens are asked about what worries them, top responses include the economic crisis, immigration and international terrorism.

All these factors have caused a radical change in the concept of public security, as crime can no longer be the focus of our talks on security, despite forming part of it. Public security becomes a broader and more complex idea which includes different fields. As we will see later, they refer to quality of life, coexistence, space planning, good conflict resolution devices and, moreover, good police and justice services.

The resulting definition may seem extraordinarily broad, just like the concept of human security primarily used in the setting of the United Nations, which will be necessary to map out. In any case, we will also need to take other factors and other players into account in order to design policies that respond to the main challenges for security, different from the police force and the criminal system, even though they continue to be relevant players.

At some time, most states have tried, with different degrees of intensity and different modes, to draw up responses or plans with a cross-cutting nature to confront security problems. Awareness is rising that, without taking all aforesaid areas into account, it will frankly be very difficult to confront the modern challenges involving security.

The suitability, or lack thereof, of creating integrated and complex systems for dealing with security is not an absolute truth. Rather, it depends on the ideologies and the values that are the foundation for security policies. In broad strokes, there are basically two large ideological blocks that can be simplified as:

- a) Those that believe that citizens are perfectly free to choose between acting in an upright manner and breaking the law (creating threat and insecurity as a consequence). Those who decide not to follow the rules of the game must be punished and this punishment re-establishes security, intimidating possible future offenders. Any other response by public powers would be pernicious, as it would entail promoting or stimulating criminal activity and fear to crime.
- b) Those who think that insecurity, offences, crimes, even if in their final execution they are the result of individual decisions, occur in the framework of specific spatial, social and even political contexts. From this viewpoint, security or the lack thereof would be combated by trying to modify the settings and the circumstances that facilitate them.

The first model would involve backing the police and penitentiary system and

the second, without denying the need for these systems, would advocate investing more in those structures and services that favour the prevention of situations that lead to insecurity and favour crime. Indeed, some authors show that there is an inversely proportional relation between high public budgets for social spending and the number of arrests made by the police. In countries with high levels of social spending, the number of police arrests would be lower than in countries with a weaker welfare state⁸. There are groups that argue that the second model is economically unviable, despite declaring its goodness. This would mean increasing social spending for an undefined period of time. This argument is also debatable, especially if we take the large expenditures into account that many Western countries have allocated to their criminal police systems in recent years with results that are, to say the very least, questionable⁹.

Obviously, as we will specify hereafter, these two broad theoretical models are not normally found in a pure state. Instead, reality reflects models falling into different grey areas between the two extremes.

2. Institutional players (the role of supra-state, state and local-regional governments in producing public security)

Traditionally, the fundamental figure involved in public security had been the state. As the concept of public security had been closely linked to sovereignty, to the state's coercive power, parties involved in this field other than the state were inconceivable. This scenario has been altered by two complementary factors, in our geopolitical context:

- a) The creation of the European Communities in 1957 with the ensuing increases both in members and fields of competence, has been showing that an economic space, which was followed by a social space and common policy, with free circulation of people and goods ends up requiring some common elements of security.
- b) The expansion of the size of organised transnational crime has led to individual focuses and responses of each of the states turning out to be absolutely insufficient and ineffective.

There have been attempts (timid initially) to internationalise security since the beginning of the last century (with the first attempts at international police cooperation that many years later would give rise to the creation of Interpol)¹⁰. Subsequently and gradually, international cooperation treaties started to be signed and, within the European Communities, the need for common initiatives in some fields started to be seen in the 70s (the TREVI Group)¹¹. The event that caused

the most radical change and accelerated the process was undoubtedly the attack on the Twin Towers in September 2001, followed by the attacks in Madrid and London shortly after. These acts put the need on the table of designing regulatory and even operative instruments, above all in the European Union arena. Changes that had been unthinkable have happened in a period of less than 10 years. Thus, for example, framework decisions and directives have been approved that standardise states legislation against terrorism¹² and organised crime¹³ and that establish the European Arrest Warrant¹⁴. Mechanisms have been established that entail the recognition of legal decisions made by a member state in the territory of other member states. Europol competences have been increased¹⁵, with this body now as a Union's agency (instead of a body for intergovernmental collaboration)¹⁶, the European Police School was created, etc. The Treaty of Lisbon, recently ratified by member states, now brings many aspects concerning security into the hands of the European Union, which do not require the unanimous vote of all member states to approve measures and norms. One significant element that depicts to what point there is one supra-national player in Europe is the fact that all member states (which are theoretically the 'only' parties responsible for security) design their internal security policies explicitly using the large European security programmes, the Hague Programme (2004) and, at present, the Stockholm Programme (2009)¹⁷. Indeed, the 1999 Tampere Agreements had already established state agendas, particularly with respect to immigration (subject recurrently linked to security throughout the European Union). All European activity in this area always underlines the need to maintain a cross-cutting and integrated approach to security, as well as to respect citizens' rights¹⁸.

Secondly, the states have a prominent role in the area of security. One European federal state (Germany) has attributed security competence at an infra-state level (the *Länder*, or states) and others use a highly-decentralised police model (the United Kingdom). However, all of them have attributed strong jurisdiction to what we could call the central state to model important security issues. They can normally establish the basic rules that regulate the police, the regulatory policies for rights and the possibility of limiting them, govern police forces (in the majority of the European Union member states, the state has one or more police services, even in Germany where *The Bund* has the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA) and the federal police –*Bundespolizei*– with restricted powers, the latter for transport and borders)¹⁹, important coordination functions, particularly in the state security system (always in cases of terrorism and frequently for issues related to organised crime). Moreover, the states contribute

to drawing up the international agenda and the main parties responsible for its internal application.

This historic monopoly on state security within its territory has been seriously affected for two reasons:

- a) The majority of our states have administrations at different territorial levels. Even states that are not federal or decentralised have some degree of decentralisation at an administrative level (France, Portugal). In some cases there are infra-state territorial levels (regions, federated states or autonomous communities) that have competences and even direct players (police) in the area of security. In those cases in which infra-state territorial levels do not have direct powers in security and police matters or they are very limited (France, Portugal, Italy), all of them have some impact in fields that are essential for good security organisation. All have some competence on urban planning, teaching, housing, social services, healthcare, maintenance of public spaces, namely, areas that have an undeniable influence on security, at least in a systemic approach.
- b) Despite the oft-repeated globalisation of security, the growing presence of organised crime and undoubted international threats, concrete events that affect security end up happening in specific places, in territories, in neighbourhoods, on specific streets. Furthermore, security incidents are not identical and homogeneous throughout the state. Even at a city scope, citizen demands in one neighbourhood can be completely different from demands made in another neighbourhood. In short, at a local level, proximity continues to be necessary.

Due to this, even though the traditional definition placing security at a state level is still eminently true, states have no recourse but to give some relevance to infra-state administrations (regional and local). They are obligated to have other administrations available when designing and, even more so, applying security strategies. One clear example in Spain is the establishment of local security councils in state regulations, which brings together the police forces present at this level and co-presided over by the mayor. Although in recent decades, the Netherlands and Belgium have undertaken unification processes for their police services, they have upheld local divisions and zones where the people's municipal representatives have great power of influence and decision taking.

Namely, the regional and local players are –to differing degrees– essential players for public security policies. This doesn't mean that the state is not obliged to guarantee certain homogenised minimums and efficacy throughout its territory or that the services still in state

power don't play a leading role. Reality imposes a fundamental fact upon us: security is a particularly urban reality that is defined in a specific space. Consequently, and without detriment to coordination policies and tools, specific responses must be created, where everybody's participation is needed in order to be effective, but with an impact in the local setting.

States often tried to suppress or ignore local police in countries with a highly-delimited centralist tradition in security matters, like France and Italy. However, the difficulties police forces have had in responding to security at the micro level, has led to the re-establishment of some local police bodies, albeit with different levels of decisions and planning, and the increase of the number and activism of the pre-existing bodies²⁰.

Finally, we cannot forget that, although public security must be managed, coordinated and supervised by public powers, non-public players (private) also have a relevant role there. Firstly because the dynamics specific to our societies (great mobility, highly irregular occupation of the territory, many activities that generate risk, etc.) mean that public powers cannot protect citizens all the time and in all places. Thus, following the guidelines and regulations made by public powers, citizens in some way must assume their responsibilities by avoiding risks and adopting measures that contribute to their security. Moreover, there are activities that generate widespread or very concentrated risks and that generate considerable economic benefits to private players. In those cases the companies involved must also assume responsibility for guaranteeing security in these spaces; because they cause the risks and get the benefits of it (clear examples could include chemical companies, shopping centres or large sports events and concerts). These private players move normally at local levels, without ruling out that they could have a role at regional and state levels in concrete and specific cases in which circumstances or the regional dimension of the issue thus requires it.

3. Public security policies (from punitive populism –zero tolerance– to community strategy –neighbourhood police)

As seen, public policies on security heed a specific concept of social life, of what is good and what is bad, of the definition of the mission and objectives that public powers must pursue. The combination of different values and different perspectives can give rise to very different public policies. Among these options, there are two broad models that are theoretically the two extremes of the hypothetical range of possible

security policies: punitive populism (zero tolerance) and communitarian strategy.

In recent years, punitive populism has had a highly-significant and leading role, due to the very widespread diffusion of the Zero Tolerance experience initiated in New York by Chief constable Will Bratton, with political support from the former city mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, in the 1994-96 period. There was a relatively long period during which the idea had been imposed that police intervention and criminal punishment did not resolve security problems because security does not depend only on crimes and, furthermore, crimes have terribly complex causes. Suddenly, the publication of an apparently simplistic and straightforward article in 1982 contributed to a significant change in this tendency. That year, Wilson and Kelling published their famous article that set forth their broken windows theory²¹. According to the authors, disorder, both physical (a broken window that nobody repairs) and social (antisocial behaviour), causes apprehension among good citizens, who end up fleeing from public spaces because they feel unsafe there. This favours crime and criminals moving in, so that an irreparable deterioration process starts, leading irrevocably to larger crimes²². According to the authors, the solution to this problem must focus on very strict police action in order to re-establish the social controls that had disappeared in previous years. This would prevent any type of disorder, offence or crime. In order for this policy to work well, a certain amount of 'understanding' of police actions is required, as well as preventing turning all police activities into legal issues²³. Twelve years later, Will Bratton put this idea into practice at the New York Police Dept. with the aforementioned and world-known Zero Tolerance policy. This policy was focused on attacking any street offence, no matter how small (drinking, urinating, jumping the subway turnstiles, graffiti, smoking marijuana)²⁴, penalising and, if necessary, detaining the offenders, within the zones previously classified as 'disorderly'. The aim of this political strategy was to detain a large number of criminals, since when the parties committing these small offences had to provide identity to be fined and/or arrested, it would be discovered that they had committed other crimes for which they had not yet been punished. Moreover, intense police action would intimidate future potential offenders, who would be dissuaded from partaking in behaviours defined as offences, in light of seeing that the chances of being punished were very high.

This policy coincided with a generalised drop in crime in the city of New York (which had started three years earlier to the arrival of Bratton and Giuliani)²⁵. Immediately, both, Chief constable and mayor explained to the world that there was a cause-effect relationship between the Zero Tolerance policy and the drop in crime. Namely, security

had returned to the city of New York thanks to the punitive policies carried out by the municipal administration. A stream of admiration and imitation soon followed throughout the Western world, independently of the political colours of the governments. Thus, one of the heads of state who most enthusiastically embraced the policy was Labour leader Tony Blair, albeit with a few more 'socialising' traits. One of the first emblematic laws of his first legislature was the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, which established legal mechanisms so that the local police and authorities could suitably respond to disorder. Subsequently, successive Labour governments would continue in the same direction, including the enactment of the 2003 Antisocial Behaviour Act.

In France, it was the conservative governments that succeeded Lionel Jospin who would most closely follow zero tolerance. In general terms on continental Europe, the zero tolerance wave did not mean a mimetic following of the American experience. The nearly direct tie that Bratton established between disorder and crime was not adopted here with the same vigour and intensity. There were two main consequences in Europe:

- a) Revival of the idea that the existence of a serious and credible punitive threat would intimidate and deter criminals and, therefore, contribute to preventing crime. More illustrative examples are the constant reforms that increase incriminating behaviours and punishment in French, Italian and Spanish penal codes (since the drawing up of the new Spanish penal code in 1995, there have been more than 20 reforms in this direction). Indeed, in Spain at this time a large reform has been approved that modifies again recent reforms, among others, in the area of theft crimes and misdemeanours.
- b) Some concern about combating incivilities more severely, assuming that incivility causes a lack of security. The most diaphanous consequence of this trend has been the creation of a multitude of municipal by-laws that typify many uncivil behaviours as offences to facilitate authorities and their agents being able to charge and fine offenders. Some authors have debated their constitutionality for a wide range of reasons, including arguments that claim the stigmatisation of specific groups and some ways of life²⁶.

Almost 15 years after the New York experience, nobody has been able to empirically prove the positive effects of this policy. The majority of large American cities experienced noteworthy drops in crime in the same period, whether or not they had implemented Zero Tolerance policies²⁷. Later research has made the enormous difficulty of establishing a

causal relation between disorder and crime. However, there is no doubt cast upon the fact that disorder can frequently lead to a perception of insecurity in some groups.

At the other end of the scale, there are community policies and strategies, which are typically qualified as community, proximity or neighbourhood police, in reference to the priority instrument participating in the process, namely, the police. These policies place the community at the heart of security. The citizens and neighbours in the different neighbourhoods making up the cities must be the focus of security. This approach means that people are the origin (they establish the priorities) and the final goal of public security (they receive the service)²⁸. The aim of public services is to satisfy citizens' needs and resolve the problems underlying them, where the police are catalysts in these policies²⁹. This intense connection between the authorities and the security services and the population does however have some limits:

- a) Security services and the rest of the public services cannot meet needs that involve clear infractions of legal and fundamental rights recognised in constitutional texts. Thus, if, for example, the neighbours in a certain neighbourhood or country demand that a specific group, ethnic group or nationality is expelled from public spaces, this request must be managed somehow, but without agreeing to the specific demand under those terms.
- b) The police –the security service par excellence– alone cannot resolve the problems, conflicts and shortcomings that they detect in public life and that have an influence on people's perception of insecurity. For example, if there are service deficits that contribute to specific youth groups remaining conflictive, the police can detect the problem, but not resolve it. If there are coexistence problems based on cultural reasons between neighbours in the same buildings or neighbourhoods, the police can intervene by channelling and supervising the problem. However, it would be very difficult for them to resolve it alone.

In summary, public powers, the police which –let's not fool ourselves– is the core agent of security policies, must execute the governance of security, in the sense that they must 'govern' (manage) the different players and networks that are, in one way or another, those that influence security in order to obtain a positive result for citizens' security. As it can be seen, communitarian philosophy differs significantly from punitive, as the punishment and the sentencing are mere instruments and not the reference point for the system, as is what happens in zero tolerance. Nonetheless, we can find concomitances in practice or, in other

words, there are zero tolerance policies that try to remain rooted in the community (or part thereof) and communitarian policies that can, in specific concrete situations, turn to zero tolerance practices to redirect a situation. However, in this latter case, specific punitive practices heed broader strategies and objectives and are merely circumstantial.³⁰

When speaking about how communitarian strategies have to be managed by the police, a debate about organisation always arises that is more prominent than we think it should be. The discussion focuses on whether a community policing strategy must be reflected in the organic structure of the police force and, if so, if this is enough to confirm that this is indeed a communitarian model. In other words, in a catalogue on police force work posts, does 'community police' have to appear as its own entry? Advocates of this solution argue that, particularly in structures with great bureaucracy or that are highly syndicated, if these posts do not exist, police officers would end up devoting time to community policing tasks or not, depending on the commander or political authority du jour. The only way of upholding the model would be the existence of officers earmarked for posts whom, according to their legal cataloguing, must obligatorily carry out neighbourhood or community tasks. However, the underlying matter is that highly-bureaucratised bodies have great difficulty in adapting to communitarian strategies.

Against considering this solution as adequate, the argument must be put forward forcefully according to which, we are speaking of policies, community strategies that are very difficult to limit to a concrete unit or concrete job posts. In other words, the entire security administration, the entire police service, would have to be imbued with the principles of communitarian philosophy, without prejudice to the fact that some would more frequently work in upholding stable and fluid relations with neighbours and others to investigating crimes and public order issues. All would have to be clear about the people's priorities and organise the service directed at citizens. If the existence of jobs catalogued as such helps or not to guarantee these types of policies, after the paramount principles are accepted, it is simply a matter of strategy.

Another topic for discussion at this time is how to adapt these types of strategies to the present situation. Traditionally, community policing had been centred on patrolmen, the police men and women who patrol the streets, who met the neighbours during the course of their workdays, in the squares, at school entrances, on terraces, in bars, etc. Through this network of contacts, they received information both about the neighbourhood's existing problems and

needs. These would then be directed to the appropriate units or services in order to seek solutions. Furthermore, some countries (very clearly in the Spanish political transition) shaped highly-structured, active and representative neighbourhood associations that facilitated dialogue with the community. In the modern day, neighbours aren't in the street much, especially during the workday (in many families both partners work) and associations, in general, have lost their strength and representativeness. What does that mean for community police officers? That they should leave the street? A radical affirmative response could end up being an exaggeration. However, what is true is that citizens must be the source and the purpose of security policies and services. A way must be sought to keep contacts there. If new technologies have seen the appearance of many virtual forums, it may be a solution to bear in mind if citizens can be found there and contacts can be made³¹. What is important is the contact, the communication with citizens, not patrolling or not the street.

4. Strategies for preventing public insecurity (social prevention, situational prevention, video surveillance, the creation of public spaces aimed at social objectives)

Preventing public insecurity has always been an issue where there is fictitious consensus. Everybody theoretically agrees with the fact that prevention is the key issue to security, as reaction and the repression of law-breaking behaviour occurs when the offence, the social wrong, has already happened. The problem rests in determining what we are talking about when we speak of prevention. There are two broad trends in this point, which reproduce the paradigms looked at in the first section of this article, which give rise to two clearly different models:

- a) One whose objective is to tackle conflicts, social imbalances and the lack of definition of life in society, especially in urban spaces, which generate insecurity (social prevention).
- b) Another which bases prevention on reducing the opportunities to commit crimes (situational prevention). The objective of prevention has to be to eliminate hidden spaces without surveillance, to increase the number of police officers patrolling the streets, to install video surveillance cameras in the majority of public spaces, etc.

These positions are not radically exclusive and neither are either of them irrefutable truths. While it is frequently true that security problems are the consequence of social imbalances and conflicts, there are also cases when crimes are committed by people who are perfectly integrated into the system, in order to obtain personal benefits. On the other

hand, situational prevention carried to the utmost extremes would convert our societies into police states, into a 'big brother', which would always be watching us, without recalling the reasons and the elements that contribute to insecurity and crime.

Social prevention tries to eliminate the causes, the circumstances, the environments that generate threats to security. For example, in a neighbourhood populated by people with scarce economic means without spaces or activities where children and youth can play and have fun, there is a strong possibility that these children and adolescents end up occupying the existing spaces and self-organising activities that, while not crimes per se, generate feelings of danger or insecurity to the rest of the neighbours (playing ball on the sidewalks, close to the elderly, listening to extremely loud music in front of houses where people need to sleep, painting walls with graffiti, even consuming alcohol and drugs, etc.). The ghettoisation of some areas and neighbourhoods, with concentrations of a single population type, normally marginalised, with few resources, without the power to resist the pressures of large criminal organisations, can contribute to the establishment of mafias or gangs there. If we centre solely on quashing criminal behaviour, without modifying the social structure that favours them, in the best of cases, we will be faced with a situation very difficult to change, as the arrest and imprisonment of some criminals is simply compensated by the entry of new members³².

The current instrument par excellence for situational prevention (besides the physical presence of police or security guards) is video surveillance cameras. The increase in number of risky places, the increased mobility of people, the change in social habits have all made it nearly impossible to always have someone watching over what is happening in the street. Video surveillance has appeared as a suitable solution to the problem. The mass installation of video cameras aims both to suppress offenders, through the evidence of registered facts, and to deter potential offenders, who would know that their actions could be proven. This filming fever³³ has been set in motion without taking several relevant matters into account:

- a) Cameras represent an undeniable violation of fundamental rights (to the own image and particularly to privacy), which must be justified and weighted in all cases³⁴.
- b) The film recordings would have to be supervised live or later and someone would have to manage their storage and elimination, where applicable, guaranteeing access rights to the people who could hypothetically appear on them.

There is no research that verifies the determining influence of installing video cameras, beyond displacement of the problems in some cases. Even a report by the London Metropolitan Police, published in summer 2009, shows that despite the large number of cameras in London³⁵, there are very few criminals detained and sentenced because of the video recordings. The majority of the tapes have never been seen by anybody, as there are not enough personnel for these purposes³⁶.

In any case, reality has shown us that insecurity requires a more complex and better thought out approach, which takes the causes of the problems into account and tries to tackle them, but does not rule out without contemplation all elements of situational prevention that could be very useful and that, sometimes, can stem from more in-depth reforms and approaches³⁷. This is how it was understood by an old trend³⁸ which aims to design public spaces by considering the activities and the people who will use them. This involves constructing spaces that, in addition to considering aspects related to situational prevention, avoiding hidden spaces and those without visibility, obtaining good lighting, etc., would also be spaces with services for their inhabitants, allowing for different activities to be held, contributing to the peaceful occupation of public spaces, the coexistence of different social classes, etc.³⁹. It is about creating socially integrating spaces, which facilitate life to its inhabitants and their appropriation of the space.

This awareness of the need for a cross-cutting and plural approach to security has also led to considering the need to formalise and plan security. If we agree that security problems have multiple angles and, thus, they require initiatives from a wide range of players, these initiatives must then be organised, as they have different origins and dependencies, they can only work jointly if their relations are formalised. Security plans respond to this need, which have a growing presence in our societies⁴⁰ and those local security contracts set in motion in France by the government of Lionel Jospin, afterwards cornered by the governments of the Chirac and Sarkozy. All of them are about organising the actions of the different parties involved (primarily public) so that the factors and elements that contribute to insecurity are counteracted and minimised.

5. Evaluating public security policies

The growing politicization and formalisation of security has put the need on the table to evaluate security policies and strategies. It is essential to know if the policies and measures adopted are useful for their aims, both with respect to their confirmation or rectification, and

the taking on of different technical and political responsibilities that could derive from these. The search for indicators that guide us in this direction have been vertiginous and frenetic in recent years. However, this is not a new need. In the second half of the 20th century, the insufficiency of police records as the only indicator of the state of security was revealed (actually, the police records only speak of police activity, in a strict sense). This confirmation paved the way for the appearance of the first victimisation surveys, the National Crime Victimization Survey in the United States and the British Crime Survey. These surveys sought to obtain data about the unreported crime figures, which weren't known by the police for different reasons, as well as opinions and perception of the population about security, information that doesn't appear in police data. Later, French surveys followed, and were recently consolidated with the *Cadre de Vie et Sécurité* survey, as well as the surveys carried out in Catalonia starting in the eighties. They culminated with the *Enquesta de seguretat pública de Catalunya*, run by the Ministry of the Interior of the Government of Catalonia, working jointly with the Institute of Regional and Metropolitan Studies of Barcelona and the Barcelona City Council, which have been administered annually since 1999. Very recently, Eurostat implemented a pilot scheme of a European Victimization Survey whose aim is to be used as a comparable parameter of the condition of security and crime in all European Union member states.

This pressure to have reliable and transparent indicators, available to everybody, has also led to a better organisation and processing of police records, making them accessible to the public. This represents a break from the traditional obscurantism of police organisations. Among the most noteworthy examples, the implementation of the COMPSTAT system in the city of New York merits mention, which was set in motion during the Zero Tolerance policies. This system permitted the almost real-time monitoring of the development of crime in each and every one of the city's police districts, allowing for management and administration decisions to be taken on matters of public security (that could even entail the termination of service for the chief of the precinct) and, furthermore, this information was supplied to the general public almost immediately⁴¹. We have also felt this need in Europe. Thus, for example, France, which had never stood out for its transparency with regard to police records, started up a system during Nicolas Sarkozy's term as Minister of the Interior to publish crime data each month on the website of the National Observatory for Crime and Criminal Responses⁴².

The complexity of the security indicators, due to the plurality of data that must be taken into consideration, has entailed the setting up of several crime and security observatories that aim to offer reliable indicators on the status and development of security from a broader, more plural and independent perspective. In some cases, these observatories have been established nationally (France and Ireland), even though they are normally regional or local (Toulouse, Grenoble, Porto, some South American cities like Quito and Medellín, etc.). Very recently, the European Union has echoed this need and included, among the objectives of the Stockholm Programme, the creation of a European Observatory for the Prevention of Crime, committing the Commission to present a concrete proposal before the end of 2013⁴³.

The lifespan of the existing observatories is still generally very short, and therefore we do not have enough data to perform a serious evaluation. In any case, what is clear is that doing consistent evaluations of the status of security entails a need to work with indicators from different sources and to try to cross-reference them suitably to take maximum advantage of their potentials. An example of this is the attempt by the British Home Office in the last years when, in its annual report⁴⁵, it carries out a joint interpretation of the data from the police records and from the British Crime Survey, with regard to England and Wales⁴⁶.

representing a 52% increase in a short period of time (Source: http://www20.gencat.cat/docs/Justicia/Documents/ARXIU/butlleti_serveis_penitenciaris_desembre2009.pdf).

7 Vid. Beck (2008).

8 Vid. Curbet (2009), p. 15 and ff.

9 Vid. for example Waller (2006).

10 On the origins and functions of Interpol, *vid.* Anderson (1989).

11 On the origins, functions and development of the Trevi Group, *vid.* Benyon et al (1993).

12 Framework Decision 2002/475/JAI by the Council dated 13 June 2002, modified by Framework Decision 2008/919/JAI, published in the OJ on 9 December 2008.

13 Vid. for example, Framework Decision 2008/841/JAI published in the OJ on 12 November 2008, whose objective is to standardise legislations of the member states on organised crime.

14 Vid. Framework Decision 2002/584/JAI by the Council dated 13 June 2002, with entry into force in member states on 1 January 2004 (Official Journal L 190 of 18-7-2002).

15 For a clear overview of the changes in Europol functions, *vid.* DEN BOER (2007).

16 Vid. the Council Decision of 6 April 2009 (2009/371/JHA) on the creation of the European Police Office as a European Union body since 1 January 2010 (published in the Official Gazette on 15 May 2009).

17 The version in English can be viewed at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:115:0001:0038:EN:PDF>

18 Clearly and highly renowned in the Stockholm Programme, currently in its execution phase.

19 With the exception of the one cited in Germany and, to some degree, that in the United Kingdom.

20 Vid. Carrer (2003).

21 Vid. Wilson and Kelling (1982)

22 For a more detailed explanation of the entire construction of the broken windows theory and its transfer to the Zero Tolerance policies, *vid.* Guillen Lasierra (2009).

23 Some authors have argued that the large and underlying objective of Wilson's and Kelling's theory is to undermine the trend on individual rights that has developed in the United States in the years prior to the publication of the article (*vid.* Bertaccini (2009)).

24 In this area, detainments leaped from 3000 in 1994 to 50,000 in 2000, without marijuana consumption reducing more than with other alternative policies (*vid.* Johnson, Golub and Dunlap, 2008).

25 As pointed out, among others, Waller (2006), p. 17 and ff.

26 An extremely paradigmatic case of this controversial trend was the civic ordinance approved by the Barcelona City Council (*vid.* Borja, 2006).

27 Vid. Guillen Lasierra (2009).

28 Defining the policy from the police, we could say, following Sir Robert Peel, that community police employ the basic principle of '*the police are the people and the people are the police*'.

29 Even through police policies aimed at problem resolution, originating in Goldstein's works (*vid.* for example, Goldstein, 1990), are sometimes handled on the fringes of community strategies, they have an absolutely undeniable relation there.

30 Martín López (2009). In the framework of dealing with juvenile violence that we could assess as 'commentary', the author verifies that police action in corrupt situations can contribute to making youth realise that their groups are not as invulnerable as they think and show them the need to select other alternatives.

31 In Belgium, some police zones (Leuven) now use Facebook to uphold communication channels with local university students. In Helsinki, the police is active on Facebook and YouTube.

32 In issue 11 of the Catalan Public Security Magazine (December 2002), there are articles explaining the parameters of prevention policies in surrounding countries.

33 This is still within reasonable limits in Catalonia. Between 2007 and 2009, a total of 209 video-surveillance devices were authorised (including both landlines and mobiles) that were operated

by public police bodies (local police forces and Generalitat Police/Mossos d'Esquadra) (Source: Citizen Security Protection Service, Secretariat of Security, Ministry of the Interior, Institutional Relations and Participation).

34 Vid. Guillen Lasierra (2006).

35 According to data from the British authority on data protection (Information Commissioner's Office), 4.2 million video cameras had been installed in the United Kingdom by 2007, many of these in London.

36 Vid. *Público* newspaper dated 28 August 2009.

37 In this regard, *vid.* Van Soomeren (2001).

38 Jane Jacobs was one of the pioneers. Her book *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, outlined the need to conceive of cities so that there were public figures in public spaces who could carry out the lost social controls.

39 Vid., among others, LAUB (2010) clearly highlights the problems posed by present-day urban planning.

40 Such as the security plans promoted by the Scottish government, Belgium's national security plan and the autonomous community security plans that are proliferating in Spain, after Law 4/2003 was introduced in Catalonia (already two editions) (*vid.* Guillen Lasierra, 2006).

41 SILVERMAN (1999) provides an excellent description of the system. More recently and in a joint work with John A. Eterno, the author questioned the reliability of the system (*vid.* Eterno and Silverman, 2010).

42 It is available for open consultation at <http://www.inhesj.fr/articles/accueil/ondrp/publications/bulletin-mensuel-h151.html>

43 Vid. section 4.3.2 of the Stockholm Programme.

44 The most recent of the reports published, *Crime in England and Wales 2008/2009*, is available at <http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/crimeew0809.html>.

45 On the need and possibility of growth of different indicators on security, *vid.* Nadal Gelada (2010).

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF SAFETY IN CITIES

Josep Maria Pascual i Esteve

1. Democratic governance: the new way of governing the complex network society

1.1. Characteristics of democratic governance

Democratic governance is a new way of governing contemporary societies, especially cities and metropolitan areas, which is characterised by managing the interdependencies between all of the agents involved in tackling the urban challenge and in seeking the greatest degree of collaboration and public responsibility in treating it.

Democratic governance differs from the mere corporative management between government and the large agents for developing and managing specific services, facilities and infrastructure projects. Governance is based on the consideration that the city is a collective construction. The city is the total set of relations and interactions between the different public sectors. Depending on each issue or challenge, the public agents and sectors which must be considered will be different and their level

1 The original article was written in Catalan. In this language, like in Spanish, "security" includes not only what in English is also named "security", but also what in English is named "safety". Since "security" is sometimes used in this article as "security" and sometimes as "safety" (actually the argument in it is that "security" became "safety", at least in some sense) and it would be extremely confusing for the reader to change the name every time, the author decided to translate it as "security" in all cases.

2 Vid., among others, Freixes Sanjuan (1992) and Brodat (2009).

3 As we will see in greater detail in the last chapter of this article, those originally known as National Crime Victimization Surveys, which started in the United States in the seventies and in the following decade in the United Kingdom, the most influential, the British Crime Survey.

4 The most recent publications include Wacquant (2010).

5 In Spain, crimes registered by the Ministry of the Interior jumped from 154,170 in 1972 to 1,029,996 in 1989, with constant overall increases. The sole exceptions were 1973 and 1988, in which there were slight drops with respect to the previous years (Source: 2004 *Ministry of the Interior Statistics Annual Report*, p. 29, consultable at <http://www.mir.es/MIR/PublicacionesArchivo/publicaciones/catalogo/anuarios/anuarios04/linea/ii1seguridadciudadana.pdf>). If we look at other neighbouring countries, there are similar, or even more pronounced, tendencies. Thus, for example, there were 2262 homicides/murders registered for the city of New York in 1990, almost triple those registered in Spain (Source: http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_statistics/cscity.pdf).

6 Inmates in Catalan prisons increased from 6924 on 31 December 2002 to 10,525 on 31 December 2009. In other words, an increase of 3601 inmates in a seven-year period,

of influence in the matter will, logically, be asymmetrical. The development of a city depends on the action and organisational ability of its whole; namely, on the ability to collaborate on shared objectives. The purpose of democratic governance is to strengthen the city's shared response and organisational ability in order to achieve objectives based on human development.¹ The following is the definition of governance provided by AERYC (America, Europe: Regions and Cities), the intercontinental movement between cities and regions for the promotion of territorial democratic governance:

"New art of governing territories (the method of governing specific to relational governing), whose object is society's action and organisational ability, its means is network or relations management, and its purpose is human development"¹.

In other words, a way of governing which involves steering economic and technological development according to the values of social equity, territorial unity, sustainability, ethics and the widening and deepening of democracy and political participation.

Following on from the definition outlined above, democratic governance is characterised by:

- Involvement of the public for tackling social challenges. Good governance needs citizens who are active and committed to public matters, i.e., matters concerning everyone. Therefore responsibility and participation channels are needed for all citizens because the city is a collective construction and, therefore, its result depends on the actions and interactions between all of its inhabitants. Public participation is understood to be the cooperation of citizens in overcoming the challenges that a society sets itself, and that has two implications of great importance: it generates a greater force for social transformation and it influences the assessment of the quality of political representation of those who are able to generate spaces for meeting, discussion and public collaboration.
- *Strengthening of public and civic values.* A city's progress and ability to innovate depends on the density and diversity of the interactions between the entire population. The values of respect, co-existence, trust, solidarity and collaboration are essential for building a city for everyone. Democratic governance is an option because of its democratic and civic values.
- *Re-evaluation of democratic politics and the role of the representative government.* Governance represents a change in the government's role with regard to society. The government does not simply appear as the supplier of resources and services, but fundamentally as the representative of the city, its needs and challenges.

The government does not just have competencies, but also duties. It is in charge of everything that concerns the public and therefore is the backbone of the city's action and organisational ability and of the relations between different government levels. Therefore, in democratic governance, the government's function as representative of the public acquires a more central role than in previous phases of governing.

- *Shared construction and strengthening of general interest.* In governance, general interest is not attributed to a group of civil servants or to the political class. General interest is a collective construction which must be led by the politicians elected as the people's representatives, based on the legitimate interests and needs of all citizen sectors. Democratic governance means a specific action of governing so that all of the citizens' needs and challenges are present both when deliberating on and implementing policies, especially those which affect the most vulnerable sectors.
- *Transparency and accountability* are other essential conditions of democratic governance. Without them, the city government will have difficulty receiving the support and involvement of the public when articulating the various agents in a common action.

Democratic governance corresponds to a way of exercising government in which the fundamental is not just effectively managing public funds in order to produce services and facilities for social consumption or use, but to articulate these funds through agreements and action commitments between the agents involved, which subscribe to a strategy or shared programmes devised from the identification of the challenges and needs of the different citizen sectors involved.

1.2. Governance, governability and good governing: three different concepts

The term governance² is often used quite imprecisely as a synonym of either governability or good governing. Governance, as has been pointed out, is a new way or art of governing whose main government instrument is found in managing the interdependencies between agents and in involving the public. It is therefore a non-qualifying term in the sense that it refers to a way of governing or, in other words, a way of exercising government action.

Good governing does qualify a government's action, but this government which governs well may act through the governing method or a different one; that is to say, it may govern well by using the managerial form or it may do so through governance. If this way of governing is governance, we could qualify its action as "good governance", or also as "bad governance", if it uses this way of governing badly or it does not result in governability.

By governability, in a restricted sense, we mean the acceptance of and compliance with legislation, institutional processes and conflict settlements, as well as public sector policies, by civil society and especially by its main agents. Ungovernability, on the other hand, is widespread civil disobedience, institutional mechanisms' inability to resolve social conflicts and the refusal of large sectors of society to accept the institutional rules of the games. Governability is an attribute or classification of a social situation and, in any event, may be a result of government action, of good governing, of good governance, or of any other way of governing which is well exercised in a given situation. It is important, however, not to confuse an attribute or result with the objective method of governing.

On some occasions it has also been put on a par, according to a previous conception, with the English political term 'governance', which referred to the impact on the development of a society of territory that the management of public sector resources and policies had. Thus, for example, the autonomous community of Cantabria has a good system of indicators for measuring the impact of government action on its community, which it calls governance indicators.

1.3. Emergence of democratic governance

Democratic governance is an innovative way of governing which emerges, by being generally or sectorally adopted, through a specific policy, which is increasingly in favour of local or regional governments, yet it still does not constitute the usual or "normal" way of governing. The latter is what is known as public managerialism, which consists in producing services by imitating the management techniques and values of commercial companies. Democratic governance is here to stay, for the previous forms of governing (bureaucracy and managerialism) have been made obsolete by social transformations which call for governance to be implemented, such as:

- *The increasing social complexity of the population and its needs,* due to its greater generational diversity, to the various cultural and geographical origins, to the emergence of various home and family structures, to the presence of very varied socialisation plans, to the large presence of territorial and social segmentation processes and to the development of social individuation processes.
- *The increasing vulnerability or social risk,* namely, the greater chances of being cut off, breaking away or being blocked from participating, at the levels considered socially appropriate, in one or more of the social areas established as basic: work, income, health, education, housing and social and family ties.

- *Social inequality becoming polyhedral in shape.* Traditional inequality, measured in terms of income and access to services, has had new forms of social inequality added to it, such as access to cultural and educational capital and to social ties which generate social capital.
- *The greater distribution of people's knowledge and training.* Knowledge and information society means, among other things, that people gain more knowledge, training and know how in policy development; therefore public sector knowledge is no longer exclusive to administration and is being increasingly distributed into a broad social network.
- *The stagnation of public spending in the face of rising social needs and its complexity.* When public spending accounts for 50% or more of the GDP, it cannot increase significantly when faced with new social needs.

All of this leads us to conclude that traditional forms of governing have expired due to the facts that:

- It is not possible to respond to new social challenges using public resources only, all agents need to be involved and the public need to given responsibility for their own challenges, just as public and private resources and the social initiative must be articulated into networks.
- The distribution of knowledge and social legitimacy render a top-to-bottom hierarchical way of exercising authority or of defining general interest unfeasible.
- The public cannot simply be considered as passive; i.e., as a client or user.

Democratic governance needs to be exercised as a way of managing the complexity through the effective management of interdependencies and social interactions, and the people elected, the politicians, need to fully exercise their role of democratic representatives in order to build general interest based on the legitimate interests of all agents and sectors present, and articulate strategies, programmes and projects by sharing knowledge and challenges, but also resources and action commitments.

2. Public safety calls for democratic governance

The complexity of factors which influence public safety in a city or metropolis entails intervention requiring, on the one hand, transversal action, in the sense that various policies coincide: education, health, urban, social welfare, and on the other hand, the articulation of public and private agents at different territorial levels. In other words, an effective policy on democratic public safety needs democratic governance.

2.1. Two concepts of public safety: broad and strict

In order to understand the complexity of public safety we must begin by conceptually clarifying that there are two views on public safety which influence each other reciprocally:

- *Public safety in the broad sense* refers to a multidimensional policy for reducing risk situations (U. Back, 2008) and social vulnerability, or as we pointed out above, it aims at reducing the possibilities of an individual or group becoming cut off, or that its possibilities of participating in a social area that it deems suitable are blocked. Our societies have been characterised as societies of vulnerability and risk because of their intense processes of change, which furthermore are taking place on a global scale, with more unpredictability and, therefore, less ability to anticipate or foresee.
- *Public (un)safety in the strict sense*, in which we identify two dimensions: one that we will call objective and another known as subjective (J. Curbet, 2010). By objective dimension we mean the statistical probability of a person being the victim of any type of crime, especially an attack on them personally or their family members or property. The subjective dimension is the fear of being a victim of delinquency. In other words, one issue is the objective situation experienced by citizens and another is how some citizens perceive or represent that situation.

These two dimensions don't always coincide. It is usual for situations of subjective insecurity or insecurity to experience a rise while the objective situation remains stable, as a result of the treatment a piece of news is given by the media or the establishment of urban policies based on generating fear. On the other hand, the rise in subjective insecurity, at the same time, causes objective insecurity, as the feeling of being unsafe is generally associated with stigmatising social attitudes towards groups of people or neighbourhoods, which are attributed the scapegoat role and are the object of social segregation. This segregation destroys their social opportunities and encourages them to use illegal means to guarantee their existence.

Furthermore, public safety in the broad sense influences public insecurity in both dimensions, objective and subjective, of safety in the restricted sense. In fact, the situation of risk or widespread social vulnerability always gives rise to higher levels of widespread fear or liquid fear in our society (Z. Bauman, 2007). This insecurity is aggravated in situations of social and economic crisis, due to the rise in probabilities of being cut off or marginalised, and a greater fear is generated which, when not properly channelled (generally it is not), it easily becomes social insecurity, a hunt

for scapegoats, social exclusion and deterioration of democratic values.

The policy for strengthening public safety in the broader sense has a large common denominator with the policy for making cities more socially inclusive. The policy which requires greater specificity, however, is the policy on safety in the stricter sense, especially a safety policy whose purpose is to strengthen the public's democratic and civic values.

2.2. Dimensions of the public safety policy

Policies on public safety, and more specifically on social prevention, have two large fundamental dimensions from the same policy:

1. Those which are directed at the urban environment, i.e., for changing the social and physical conditions which influence attacks between people and their private or public property.
2. Those which are aimed at the public perception-reaction system (PPRS) for reducing stigmatising social reactions and strengthening co-existence and solidarity relations.

In order to show the large variety of components intelligibly and as a summary, we have devised the interpretative diagram in figure 1.

Whether a public safety policy depends more on one dimension than the other will be governed just as much by the social and cultural set-up of the particular city as by the government's ideology and relationship with the people.

The type of relationship between the government and the people is very important for setting up urban safety. A relationship in which citizens appear as a passive entity, namely as mere public services users or clients, including protection services, will demand police action and control measures for the alleged offending population whenever a rise in insecurity is perceived. In other words, a passive population to a large extent demands repressive safety or social exclusion. The opposite is also true: repressive and authoritarian governments bring out public passiveness in order to gain authoritarian control over public spaces, since, as J. Borja (Borja, 2003) points out, over-explicit means or very urgent demands for order make freedom disappear.

On the contrary, active citizens who are civically committed feel responsible and important in the way they develop their city, and therefore, will demand a communitarian and multi-dimensional safety policy which is based on protecting public space so that it is not just a space for meeting and co-existing, but also a space of prevention as well as social promotion for offenders in order

to positively channel explicit and latent social unrest which is at the root of situations of violence. A socially active public calls for democratic safety, safety which is constructed in a shared way amongst the different agents and citizen sectors (J. Prats, 2010)³, and inclusive safety, i.e., that its action becomes processes for improving social inclusion.

2.3. Areas and purposes of the policy for inclusive and democratic safety⁴

The socially inclusive and democratic safety policy will concentrate on five major areas. The first is in reference to safety in the broad sense and the rest refer to safety in its reduced sense and its meaning of prevention⁵ for inclusive safety:

Area 1. Structural or general. This area should serve as a referential and strategic framework for all urban policies, and particularly for safety. It constitutes the action criteria which the policies should foster in order to generate new opportunities for all people and reduce social vulnerability, as well as improved integration of spaces and people.

It contains the measures for accessibility, new central areas in the peripheral neighbourhoods, public spaces for meeting and co-existence, the development of new productive and vocational activities, provision of social, cultural and education facilities, etc. In other words, measures for:

- Building a quality urban environment for everyone.
- Generate new opportunities with positive action criteria for the most disadvantaged people and neighbourhoods.
- Strengthen a culture of co-existence and trust amongst the public.
- Make the preventative policies more social in the metropolitan and regional area.

The general or structural area, which is for strengthening safety in the broad sense, is essential so that programmes or measures related to safety in the strict sense have a chance of succeeding. If the city progresses towards a model which segregates spaces and neighbours, social investments and investments in protection will only serve to justify urban development which is socially and environmentally unsustainable. The option of a sustainable and integrative city model is essential for developing inclusive public safety.

Area 2. Inclusive action. These are the programmes containing measures aimed particularly at people in situations of major social vulnerability, or who are in a state of severance from society or marginality. In general, they are specific culture, sports, health, education and social services measures which constitute important prevention from the public safety perspective.

Area 3. Reduction of social reaction. The purpose of these programmes is to reduce social rejection of offenders, and in particular to prevent the rejection of offenders from spreading to groups of people and neighbourhoods, as well as to prevent territorial and social stigmas which channel social unrest towards mutual segregation and violence from spreading. These are policies which concentrate on values, social communication and on positive channelling and relational reinforcement of conflicts.

Area 4. Activating citizens and civic commitment. These are programmes to make citizens civically responsible for and committed to building a city, fighting for violence prevention and against vulnerability and social severance. They are very related to Area 3 and refer to programmes of community action, to the promotion and organisation of social volunteerism, to programmes of responsibility and active, civic commitment of the public in relation to their fellow citizens, city and neighbourhood. What is especially important is introducing values and transferring knowledge in all projects and actions carried out by the local government which deal with social and territorial safety and unity.

Area 5. Dissuasion. This is about making offending difficult. This area incorporates measures on the lighting and surveillance of public spaces, urban design, police presence and deployment, neighbourhood police, etc. These police surveillance and protection measures take a very different direction in the inclusive and democratic safety policy. They do not involve using the police to control urban space or segregating public spaces, but guaranteeing the broader and more intense use of these spaces by the public. This means that there is no private appropriation of space by violent groups or by those who isolate and privatise the city with their gated urban developments. It involves providing safety in order to guarantee that everyone living or working in the city will make the city their own.

3. Inclusive and democratic safety requires governance

Tackling the complexity of inclusive and democratic safety requires a government approach based on democratic governance, and particularly through the integral articulation of the different projects and public policies, the articulation of public and private cooperation and the strengthening of active civic commitment from the public. In other words, the transversality or integralness of policies and improvement of the city's action and organisational ability.

3.1. Transversality or integralness of city policies

Responding to the complexity of contemporary needs, and particularly to public safety, means, as we have pointed out, a clear methodological option for the integralness of action, aware that responding to safety challenges increasingly requires co-ordinated, multi-level actions (between the different levels of public administration), horizontal actions (between public administration and social and business initiatives), transversal or integral actions (which tackle different dimensions of the territory's policies: health, social services, employment, police, etc.)

In order to progress with the methodology of integralness, it is necessary to consider two dimensions of any public policy's objectives. The objectives connected to the implementation of services and public facilities, such as places in homes, home help, the number of schools or hospitals in existence, the number of police officers and police services, etc., and the population served by these services or facilities. These are the objectives related to developing various services systems: social services, local police service, healthcare, education and housing amongst others, which are fundamentally measured by coverage indicators (percentage of places per population, school-going population, population assisted by home help, etc.).

There is, however, a much more important dimension, which are the objectives that we will term the objectives of impact, i.e., of impacting on the public's abilities for development or human potential. In other words, the objectives which seek to improve the levels of safety, health, social inclusion, education, and which are measured by indicators termed result indicators (life expectancy, population with successful or failed schooling, percentage of poor people among the total population, victimisation rate, etc.).

It is clear that the services and facilities systems (protection, health, social services, education, sports, etc.) are for reaching objectives of impacting on human development. Each services system mostly influences one or two objectives which impact on the development of human abilities, but it is not the only factor which affects the objective. As we have seen in the case of inclusive safety, there are many other influencing factors.

There is a frequent misunderstanding in public policies in general, which is seeing the impact objectives for the public's human development abilities as related to a system of specific facilities. Thus, education is the specific and practically exclusive aim of the system for learning, the other systems can only

help or contribute to the system for learning, which furthermore is designated education system. The same occurs with reducing poverty or social inclusion in relation to social services.

This conception, combined with the usual way of governing, which concentrates on the provision of services financed with public funds, assumes that the organisation of territorial governments is mainly based on the services and facilities systems. In this organisational structure, the provision and direct or indirect management of these services is the basis of political power in public administration. Structured organisation by services and facilities systems involves:

- Fragmentation of government action, since public impact objectives are diluted, and it is also prone to interdepartmental conflict of competencies, which always leads to nothing, in order to obtain greater resources which have limited competency with other departments and to gain competence in actions aimed especially at certain segments of the population (women, children, old people, drug-dependent population, etc.).
- At the same time, this organisation weakens public cooperation with private and citizen initiatives by considering the main political priority to be the management of public resources and not the coordination of actions for obtaining greater impact on the public.
- All this hampers achieving results in terms of human development of the territory and quality of life.

Nowadays, given the complexity of urban challenges, it is very difficult to maintain, in practice, the self-sufficiency of departments centred on services and facilities systems, yet this view or zombie approach (living dead) and the lack of creativity and ability to innovate which is associated with reproducing such powerful and out-of-date government habits, make it difficult to integrally manage facilities organised according to impact objectives on the public .

In figure 1 we summarise this powerful and obsolete approach or view which makes integral, or simply transversal action an illusion, i.e., unfeasible.

Relational management opts for an approach that is both simple and obvious in order to overcome this method (see graphic 2). Public policy's main objectives are considered to be those which impact on the public's human development abilities. These objectives would be shared out among different services systems. Therefore, public policy would be based on the development of projects whose objectives impact on the public and, in order to achieve them, it would articulate the deployment of various facilities and services coordinated for this purpose.

The public impact objective of diminishing the chances of people or territories

becoming the victim of an attack on themselves or their property is, as we have pointed out, an objective shared among employment, education, social services, transport, urbanism, sports, cultural services, etc., in other words, shared among all of the facilities which are related to vulnerability reduction, public reaction and civic commitment.

For this reason, the progress or regression of projects would be measured by social impact indicators or indicators of results in public safety, in the broad or restricted sense of safety, and would complement the indicators measuring the deployment of services or their activity.

3.2. The city's action and organisational ability as a way to achieve greater inclusive and democratic safety

Improving public safety requires a rise in the city's action and organisational ability in order to tackle the challenges of safety and civic commitment in a shared way. By action and organisational ability we mean the public's abilities to associate and to commit actively and civilly as well as the ability of agents to cooperate. In other words, public-private and interinstitutional collaboration in order to establish shared strategies and develop integral or network projects for the purpose of, in our case, improving public safety.

What are the structuring factors of action and organisational ability or, to express it differently, of the collective construction of socially inclusive and democratic safety?

To my mind, given the experience in developing public policies which generate social capital in European and Latin American cities, the main factors are:

1. *A shared strategy on public safety* among the main agents whose interdependence public safety depends on. In other words, it means having a frame of reference for all policies and agents as a basis from which they develop their own policies and actions, as well as key projects which they jointly commit to developing and carrying out. An integral and integrative strategy with clear commitments of action to improve public safety in the broad or restricted sense. A strategy which is being updated permanently, rooted in the challenges of safety and the social inclusion of people and based on the main agents' legitimate interests and competencies.
2. *A meeting and interaction model between the main agents*, adapted to:
 - a) The challenges and demands of contemporary development, enabling unavoidable conflicts to be tackled with flexibility and confidence in finding agreements of mutual benefit.
 - b) The correlations of strength or balances of power between them.
- c) Organisational practices which promote mutual knowledge and respect and which aim for action based on reciprocal commitments. The interaction model between political, social and economic agents is a key element for establishing a city's safety. Inflexibility of the model and relations between some agents can cause distrust and, hence, a lack of strategy in the medium- and long-term. An open and flexible model encourages trust along with social and business investment, which translates into major social and economic development.
3. *Presence of agent networks for the development of integral projects which are key or give structure in order to make progress on safety.* Network projects enable the various public and private agents' tasks to be articulated due to their ability to combine interests and challenges and make them common objectives which are socially useful.
4. *A culture of action and civic commitment* removed from both the culture of satisfaction the culture of complaints, bureaucracy and nihilism. The culture of action must provide:
 - a) A feeling of belonging and identification with the city or region. Have an open collective sense, not closed.
 - b) An attitude which is open both to innovation and to the social and cultural integration of new people as well as to insertion into territorial strategies which are broader than the municipality, region or nation itself.
 - c) Realistic hopes for the future, which enable people to look beyond the realities, if these are negative, and which generate rational expectations for collaboration and commitment.
 - d) Respect and confidence in other agents' actions, which is the basis for generating social capital.
5. *Social support and public participation.* The strategies for safety and the main safety projects which give structure must have an important social support and this will be more effective if it boosts and guarantees public participation as understood in two ways: as a guarantee that their main challenges and expectations in strategies are moderate and as a condition for them becoming socially responsible and involved in producing social capital.
6. *Formal and informal leaderships* between key institutional agents which are able to come together and represent most of the interests, with an ability to reach agreements and earn institutional respect for their decisions. The main leadership must, as we have pointed out, come from the most democratic institution, i.e., the one chosen by the entire public; otherwise, we would have corporate leadership,

from which it is not possible to build general interest, as it is reduced by the corporate. The degree of the representative institutions' leadership in the governance of communities will stem from its ability to involve the rest of the agents and people present in society in the building of a shared future model⁶.

7. *Articulation of local and regional policies.* This is about conceiving the region or metropolitan area as a system of interdependent cities and municipalities which are not self-sufficient, with the ability to:
 - a) Combine local and regional policies, which have objectives and instruments in the whole territory, with local safety strategies, which are able to bring specificity and integrity to the set of actions thus strengthening interinstitutional and public cooperation as well as public collaboration.
 - b) Articulate municipalities not from a set territorial organisation, but in a flexible and adaptable way depending on the network-project, i.e., from the territories that the project development covers.
 - c) Have formal and informal participation rules which determine interaction between regional and municipal authorities, as well as interaction between the various municipal authorities.

3.3. Democratic governance is based on a set of techniques and instruments

Governance and its specific management method (relational management or management of interdependencies) are based on techniques and instruments which make it an effective tool for improving organisational ability.

In a publication of the Section for Economic Promotion of the Barcelona Provincial Council⁷, I specified and explained the characteristics of a series of techniques which have proven their effectiveness in relational management. I will now list these, without explaining them, so that the reader knows that there is a wide range of them:

1. *Strategic plans*, developed in territories from private and public-public cooperation as well as from public participation, constitute a good start for governance-specific relational management by giving territories a strategy which is shared among the main agents and has broad social support. Strategic planning, as understood in this way, actually constitutes the initial phase or the planning per se of interdependency management or strategic management⁸. The strategic plans methodology is a good instrument for kick-starting territorial governance⁹.

2. *Relational negotiation of public conflicts.* Relational negotiation techniques constitute

a good instrument for developing interdependency management or relational management. Relational negotiation is a type of negotiation which takes shape because the result that one of the negotiators is seeking is primarily to consolidate and improve the relationship between those involved in the negotiation, in order to obtain greater mutual trust and be able to develop projects on the basis of cooperation.

3. *Mediation techniques.* Within the governance framework, in which local and regional governments assume leadership in the collective construction of the territory, mediation is undoubtedly one of the resources of professionals working in politics and administration. In mediation, the administration's role is to intervene so that a conflict situation between social agents can find a solution and, in the process, improve the mutual image of the parties and the trust between them. Government action means being the catalyst of an agreement without becoming a part of the agreement.

4. *Techniques for public participation and social support for public policies.* One should move from participation strategies on to participation as a strategy for strengthening action and organisational ability. Of the numerous participation techniques, the techniques that are particularly useful in relational management are those which:
 - a) Are based on clear and simple procedures with precise purposes which facilitate expressing ideas and challenges concerning an issue, and of course prevent debates from becoming endless. Participation is method and organisation. Otherwise, participation is reduced to few participants who are not very reflexive, as their interest is not so much to convince as to impose by exhaustion.
 - b) Help to generate trust, collaboration and public responsibility in the resulting agreements.
 - c) Enable city projects and objectives to be legitimised while enabling important public support for these to be obtained.

5. *Methods and techniques for network project management.* There are fundamentally two types of techniques for managing networks:
 - Management of the network's dynamics, which covers everything from the inclusion of key agents to the promotion of projects which consolidate common interests.
 - Techniques for managing structures in order to adapt them to the objectives through which they were created and which enable a culture and common perspective to be strengthened.

It is particularly useful for network management to use agent models within the framework of objective-based systematic management¹⁰.

6. *Management of public entrepreneurial and civic culture.* The technology for strengthening the characteristics of an action and entrepreneurial culture among the public is very recent. Nevertheless, there are instruments which make important impacts that can be noticed in the short term. We are referring to the internal city or regional marketing techniques; i.e., that which is aimed at the public's own identification with their territory.¹¹

7. *"Coaching" for leadership which enables.* In governance, what is strengthened is the representational value of the politician and what is required is an ability to listen, discuss, understand, convince, move and motivate for the cause of group action and the public accepting responsibility and becoming socially committed.

Furthermore, in governance, the results of action taken are no longer so much the services than the general level of social and economic development reached in the territory during its mandate and the degree of social unity achieved with the public. An evaluation of its relational management is needed and new forms, new attitudes and new skills are needed for this.

8. *Techniques for building consensus.* It is not necessary to insist on the importance of these techniques in governance. In fact, those previously mentioned on relational negotiation and public participation necessarily have an influence on the consensus. However, there is a great plurality of methodologies and techniques, apart from those mentioned and widely contrasted, in order to be able to use them, by adapting them appropriately, in the different areas in which this new art of governing is being developed.

9. *Comprehensive approach within social sciences.* In governance it is necessary to understand what each agent says in its social context and understand not just what is being expressed, but how and why it is being said. Understanding agents and analysing conflicts from the parties' different perspectives is a completely necessary, albeit obviously insufficient, condition for the proper development of governance. It involves making the subjective base on which social phenomena rest intelligible. Objective analysis of social phenomena is perfectly possible and compatible with the fact that human actions have a subjective nature.

This approach, also called the interpretative approach to social action, finds its most classic author in Max Weber¹² and aims at understanding the meaning an action has for its agent while making the reasons between the objectively observed activity and the meaning it has for the agent known.

10. *Objective-based System Management*¹³. Objective-based management techniques are a good

instrument for relational management, and not management based on formalised procedures to achieve a result, as it involves establishing objectives which are common to a set of agents which make up a social system and, in accordance with these, innovatively specify these objectives in projects that should be managed in a network.

1 See www.aeryc.org

2 Governance is a term which has been defined by the dictionary of the Real Academia Española since 2001 with a very generic definition but whose basis is correct. It defines governance as the "art or way of governing whose aim is achieving long-term institutional, social and economic development, while promoting a healthy balance between state, civil society and the economy market".

3 Joan Prats i Catalá pointed out in an excellent piece of writing (*Liberalismo y democracia*) that historically democrats have not only defended the rule of law and protection of individual freedom, but that since Aristotle they have conceived democracy as the shared construction of the *res publica*; that is, the city as the creation of all those who live in it.

4 This chapter is based on a paper written in 2005 with J.M. Lahosa and under whose name it is published: *City and Prevention: Elements for its Assessment*, for the Directorate of Prevention Services of Barcelona City Council.

5 Prevention for inclusive safety means: "Anticipatory actions (non-prosecutorial measures and actions) which aim to specifically reduce or positively channel (explicit or latent) social unrest which is at the root of attacks between people and their private and public property, and which generates public insecurity and segregative social reactions" (J.M. Lahosa and J.M. Pascual Esteve for the Spanish Urban Safety and Prevention Forum. 2008).

6 See Subirats (2003).

7 Pascual (2007).

8 For a development of this thesis see Pascual (2001).

9 Pascual (1990). In this book I put forward a set of methods and techniques which are useful for preparing territorial strategic plans which serve to kick-start territorial governance.

10 See Pascual (1999), pgs.157-162.

11 See Puig (2003).

12 We find the methodological presentation of comprehensive sociology in his work *Sobre la teoría de las ciencias sociales* (Barcelona: Península, 1971) and also in *Economy and Society*, in which he supports the importance of the subjective for sociological analysis.

13 Recommended reading on the systemic approach is L. Bertalanffy, *General System Theory*.

de Montréal) which has a population of about 3.7 million people spread over 82 municipalities.¹ The territory of the Urban Agglomeration of Montreal, with a population of 1.85 million inhabitants, covers the island and includes 15 towns in addition to the City of Montreal. The latter is made up of 19 boroughs which house 1.62 million people.

Following the successive reorganisation of 2002 and 2005, municipal responsibilities and authority are shared out among the Agglomeration, the towns and, in the case of Montreal, the boroughs. Thus, public safety and the fight against poverty come under the Agglomeration, finances and the coordination of municipal files are the towns' responsibilities, while services directly aimed at the population, such as leisure and snow clearance, come under the borough councils for Montreal or each of the councils of the 15 other towns.

Like all major cities, Montreal faces social problems such as homelessness and drug addiction. Other problems arise from the difficulties marginalised groups have regarding co-existing with residents or other users of public spaces. These problems are particularly intense in summertime. In fact, Montreal, which is a festival and tourist city (around 6.7 million tourists in 2009²), offers numerous events, such as the Jazz Festival which attracts a very large number of attendees coming from the city, the region, other areas of the country and abroad. Among the festival goers and visitors are the young as well as the not so young who, having few or no resources at all, develop various survival strategies during their stay in the heart of the city. Some become part of groups which settle and sleep in parks, which tends to irritate the people who live, work or travel through those areas.

Montreal also has to deal with a situation which is specific to it: the huge mobility of its population. In fact, 44.9% of its population moves house or neighbourhood within a 5-year period, over a third of which move to the city outskirts.³ This situation can be explained by the combination of two phenomena. On the one hand, 65.5% of Montreal's accommodation is rented housing whose occupants can easily change their place of residence and, on the other hand, a share of the population leaves the City over a five-year period to be replaced by an almost equal number of new arrivals. The moves are mostly accounted for by young people who come to Montreal for their studies, people seeking employment there or immigrants. The latter, who represent 30.7% of the population of Montreal, move around during their period of integration into the country. Often, those who do manage to successfully integrate move to the suburbs, just like many young families of the host society.

The population's average annual income is \$30,132, which is higher for men (\$34,525) than for women (\$26,044). The City's population in employment for 15 years or more comes to 853,975 people, 407,165 of which are women. The unemployment rate hovers around 9.1% while 14% of families receive government benefits to subsidise their needs. The rate of low income among people living in private households is 31.2% and 29.2% for people aged 65 years and over. This rate is 32.7% for single parent families with a female parent and 15.1% for those with a male parent. 38.3% of rented households allocate 30% or more of their income to gross rent payments while this figure is 22% for homeowners.

Since 2002, together with the Ministry of Employment and Social Solidarity (MESS, ministère de l'Emploi et de la solidarité sociale), the Health and Social Services Agency of Montreal and other partners, Montreal City Council has established a map of the priority areas requiring intervention⁴. This map indicates the areas where there is a concentration of social and economic factors, such as single parenting and low income. These priority areas are taken into account at the time of distributing budgets, particularly under the MESS and City Council agreement for the fight against poverty and social exclusion, for urban regeneration or for the setting up of pilot projects. Through periodical reviews, this data can be updated and other factors which have become significant, such as elderly people, can be considered. Several partners have agreed to use this map for grant distribution without however applying it to universal projects such as support for local consultation.

2. Crime and victimization

Overall, crime is in constant decline in the territory of the Urban Agglomeration of Montreal. In fact, offences in 2009 were 4.3% below the average of the previous 5 years and had dropped by 15.4% over the previous 10 years.⁵ For their part, the offences and breaches of the Criminal Code in 2009 had fallen by 6.5% since 2005 and by 15.4% over the previous 10 years.

In 2009, 24,682 crimes against the person were reported, which had fallen by 7.6% since 2005 and was 11.3% lower than in 1999. More specifically,

- The number of homicides increased slightly in 2009, remaining below the average of 44 for the past 10 years and that of 56 for the past 20 years.
- Murder attempts increased by 53.6% in 2009, after falling by 32.5% in 2007 and 34.9% in 2008, remaining below the average of 122 for the past ten years.
- Assaults have decreased by 6.9% in 2009, remaining close to the average

PUBLIC SAFETY IN SOME METROPOLIS OF EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

SAFETY IN MONTREAL, A GROUP RESULT

Marcel Cajelait

1. The city of Montreal and its population

Montreal is located on the island of the same name, surrounded by the Saint Lawrence river and lying at the heart of the Montreal Metropolitan Community (CMM, Communauté métropolitaine

of 13,916 for the previous five years and 4.6% lower than the average of the past 10 years.

- Sexual assaults are in decline for the fourth year in a row, falling by 14.8% in 2009, 38.3% since 2005 and 21.2% over the past 10 years.

The number of crimes against property was 87,986 for 2009, dropping by 9.5% since 2005 and by 22.9% over the course of the past 10 years. Among the latter,

- Burglaries in 2009 were up by 8%, but represented a decrease of 17.1% since 2005 and of 43.4% over the past 10 years.
- Motor vehicle theft dropped by 17.8% in 2009, having also dropped by 39% since 2005 and 52.7% in the past 10 years.
- Accounting for one third of all breaches of the Criminal Code in 2009, petty theft increased by 0.8%, but had fallen by 4.2% since 2005 and 7.5% over the past 10 years.
- In 2009, fraud was up by 0.8% having dropped by 8.7% since 2005 and by 14.2% over the past 10 years.

The figures on crime correspond to offences and infringements reported to the police. However, it is well-known that many crimes are not reported yet might be made known to crime victimization surveys. Various studies and surveys assess victimization within different contexts and for a diverse clientele. However, several factors, such as age groups, definitions and periods covered, cannot be reconciled, making it difficult, if not impossible, to establish an overall picture. The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) has studied this problem for the territory of the Quebec province and has proposed different measures for improving data compatibility.⁶

For its part, the General Social Survey on Victimization of Statistics Canada does not enable the results to be split according to municipalities owing to the sampling being too weak. The results do, however, provide an overview. According to this nation-wide survey for 2004, 34% of incidents were brought to the police's attention.⁷

Despite some gaps in victimization data, the steady drop in crime allows us to state that the City is becoming increasingly safe. Furthermore, according to the results of the 2010 Mercer survey on quality of living, Montreal takes 4th place among American cities and 21st place among the more than 320 cities assessed on an international level.⁸

There are many factors which can explain this improvement. A summarised review of some of the interventions and approaches of public safety agents will enable some of them to be identified.

2.1. The city of Montréal police service (SPVM)^{9,10}

The SPVM (City of Montreal Police Service) has about 4,600 police officers, 1,353 of which are women. In 2008, the Service responded to 597,659 calls. The units in which they intervene include: road safety, patrolling the underground, project action modules, specialised surveys, community action strategies, water police, the dog-handling unit and mounted police. They are mainly incorporated into one of the 33 district stations, 4 operational centres or the headquarters. Around 1,600 civilian employees complete the SPVM team.

The Service keeps itself informed on the development of technical and material resources, tests these if necessary and, depending on its budget, updates its material and staff tools. It also maintains connections with other police forces or associations with which they carry out exchanges to share and benefit from the best practices. In addition, a research team implements various types of work, analyses statistics and follows the development of what is at stake in public safety so that strategic planning is based on updated information.

Following on from the introduction of the district police in 1997 and the review of the coverage plan set in motion in 2007, the service applies a global approach to public safety which leads all agents involved in safety to consult with and help one another. Agreements are reached in this way with trade development companies and Tandem, the table of representative organisations of the prevention programme, among others. Moreover, in 2004 the police put watch committees in place which look out for the needs of the Black, Latin, Arab and Asian communities as well as elderly and young people's needs, so as to become familiar with their realities and thus respond better to these. In 2010, it launched its Master Plan on its relations with the public as well as its Declaration of services to the public in order to make its aims in this area known.

The SPVM also contributes to prevention. Indeed, its operation via the district police model aims to counter emerging safety problems more effectively. This enables it to get closer to the community while relying on problem solving, partnership and opening up to communities. The socio-community officer is the district station's resource person for community relations. This officer is mainly interested in the most vulnerable social groups and carries out local prevention programmes.

There are a large number of prevention activities which the SPVM participates in or implements. For example:

- *Gangs de choix* (Gangs of Choice), to prevent young people from joining street gangs,

- *Unité sans violence*, Exprimez-vous (United Without Violence: Express yourself), to prevent school violence,
- The *Beaux, jeunes et forts à l'Académie de police* day camp for young people, to develop good relations between the SPVM and these future adults,
- *Réseau réussite Montréal* (Montreal Hooked on School), to prevent early school leaving
- *Échange Jeunesse* (Youth Exchange), to bring young people from cultural communities and the police closer together.

2.2. The Tandem programme

Since 1982, Montreal has been managing the Tandem programme while other towns on the island have been offering similar programmes. In 2001, these activities were incorporated into the Montrealer Programme which supports citizen action for urban security in boroughs – Tandem¹¹. This programme puts forward the first line of intervention for preventing crime, including the security of property and the home, the security of people as well as the security of communities. A second line covers the prevention of fires, the emergency services and public safety. The activities carried out are mainly:

- Home assessment with respect to risk of burglary, fire and accidents;
- Information and raising awareness about fraud and abuse of elderly people;
- Activities for tackling bullying at school;
- Anti-theft marking of bicycles and expensive property;
- Information on bicycle safety.

Tandem management is decentralised in the boroughs. Each borough chooses its representative community organisation and establishes a contract of three years with it, specifying the resources granted and the results expected. The representative organisation's intervention is based on the diagnosis – plan of action – assessment process carried out in collaboration with institutions, other organisations and the population of the territory. In 2007, 18 community organisations were administering the programme in 16 boroughs where 45 community workers enabled 2,795 activities to be carried out, bringing 100,626 people together.¹²

2.3. Women's safety

Since the end of the 1980s, the City Council has been particularly concerned with women's safety. Following the J'accuse La Peur conference which it organised in 1992, the Council contributed to the creation of the women's action and urban security committee (CAFSU, Comité d'action femmes et sécurité urbaine), a partnership which lasted until its disbandment in 2004. After much work done on pilot projects for women's safety in public places and in municipal recreational facilities along with the

carrying out of the audit guide on women's safety in cities, the municipality and the CAFSU published the Planning Guide for a Safe Urban Environment in 2002, and the Safety Planning Training Guide the following year.

The safety guide proposed principles adapted to different public places, including residential, commercial and industrial areas, parks and open spaces, car parks, bridges and tunnels.¹³ It defined six safety planning principles:

- Know where you are and where you are going: signalisation
- See and be seen: visibility
- Hear and be heard: crowds
- Be able to get away and get help: formal surveillance and access to help
- Live in a good, welcoming environment: planning and maintenance
- Act together: community participation

After the CAFSU disbandment, several organisations like the Tandem representatives and the women's groups pursued, in collaboration with the City Council, the dissemination and application of the safety planning guide and contributed to other achievements, such as:

- The creation of the Conseil des Montréalaises (Montrealer women's council) in 2004, which gives advice on issues raised by the City Council or brings matters to the Council's attention;
- The adoption, in 2008, of a Policy for equal participation of women and men in the Montreal community.

2.4. The priority of preventing young people from joining street gangs

In Summer 2004, score-settling between street gangs was occurring in Montreal city centre, intensifying the tension experienced in other territories of the city throughout the previous months. In order to plan an integrated and concerted action for diminishing the problem, the municipality established a steering committee for the street gang issue (Comité Directeur Ville de Montréal – Gangs de Rue). This Committee is made up of representatives from the central services, Police, Social Diversity and Finances as well as from the boroughs concerned. The steering committee drafted a plan whose aims cover four lines of action: research, prevention, repression and communication.

The Directorate for Social Diversity assures the planning and coordination of the action plan, in collaboration with the central services and the boroughs, and makes sure to maintain talks and consultation with the partners concerned, particularly school committees, community organisations, the police and the Ministry of Public Safety of Quebec.

The boroughs that will participate are identified by the police, according

to factors present in their area such as gang members who reside there, violent crimes committed or presence of emerging gangs. In 2005, five boroughs were identified, to which three more were added in 2009. Each of these choose the project that must be carried out in order to respond to the objectives of their plan of action, which it establishes with the representatives of the area in agreement with the steering committee's aims. Some 30 projects have thus been implemented.

2.5. Services for homeless people

A liaison committee on homelessness was set up in 1991 within the framework of the joint Programme between the Ministry of Health and Social Services (MSSS, Ministère de la Santé et des Services Sociaux) and Montreal City Council which planned measures to respond to the critical needs in the city centre. Since then, the committee's operation and composition have been altered from time to time according to the evolution of the needs which encouraged the maintenance of consultation and collaboration between the institutions and the community organisations. In 2007, the liaison committee adopted a cross-sectoral action plan for homelessness 2007-2012.

Since the joint programme was implemented, the City Council has been supporting host and referral services for homeless men, women and young people by furnishing grants to about ten organisations that provide them with these services. Moreover, it contributes to finding solutions for the overcrowding of shelters in the cold spells through collaboration with community organisations and the Health and Social Services Network.

3. Winning leads

The interventions outlined only cover a part of the actions carried out on the territory of Montreal. Nevertheless, the summary of approaches makes it possible to pick out certain key elements in maintaining and improving safety:

- While maintaining police service levels in the districts, the SPVM bases both its municipal and local planning and intervention on the knowledge that it has of the areas and groups as well as on its updating of this knowledge through networking, research and analysis. Planning favours the implementation of actions, revised as needed, in a global approach, which is agreed upon by the partners involved. Furthermore, the SPVM makes sure that its aims and services are made known.
- For its part, the Tandem programme specifies municipal aims on which the definition and updating of local aims and their action targets are based. The

choice of these actions results from the diagnosis – action plan – evaluation process drawn up with the home environment agents according to the resources granted by the partners.

- In relation to women's safety, knowledge related to urban planning and on other risk factors is at the heart of municipal or local cooperation between partners. The latter support the mobilisation of women, and sometimes men, as well as partnership for improving women's safety and promoting the dissemination of information on this subject.
- Within the framework of the priority of preventing young people from joining street gangs, the municipal plan defines its aims according to what is known about the problem. This knowledge makes it possible to target the places of local action and to implement partner consultation for choosing and carrying out actions.
- With regard to the services for homeless people, which cover a limited territory, the target of the action determines the agents who are to engage in consultation as well as their collaboration. The drafting and following of plans enables responsibilities to be shared and membership to be adjusted according to how the situation is developing.

The following key elements are most present:

- Municipal aims which support local action;
- Planning and its updating;
- Information acquisition and sharing;
- Establishment of targeted actions;
- Partnership;
- Consultation.

These elements are in line with the results of several undertakings. For example, the municipal Network concerned with crime prevention, which has a total of 14 cities, one of which is Montreal, working in collaboration with the Institute for crime prevention of the University of Ottawa, contributed to the publication "Building a Safer Canada: First report of the National Working Group on Crime Prevention".¹⁴ This report brings together the prevention experiences of the 14 cities and emphasizes the common points of success-bearing approaches as well as the obstacles encountered.

The report highlights the importance of action which is planned in conjunction with all the organisations of the territory and all of the municipal services. It also emphasizes the need for the provincial and federal governments to establish support for municipal initiatives and confirms the primacy of local authorities for the planning, monitoring and evaluation of prevention strategies.

The experiences also spotlight the necessary involvement of the authorities,

whether elected or senior officials, in order to guarantee the success of the prevention. In fact, municipal aims must be supported and promoted by the mayor who publicly affirms the commitment of the borough council to concerted action in support of urban security. This collaboration calls upon institutions, community organisations as well as businesses while guaranteeing the participation of citizens. The latter can also get involved in maintaining and developing their safety and act in aid of both their own as well as their fellow citizens' quality of life.

The involvement of citizens in their own safety becomes the expression of their rights to safety, but also the acceptance of their responsibility in this matter. Moreover, this is the objective of chapter 6 of the Montreal Charter of Rights and Responsibilities¹⁵, which was adopted in 2005. This chapter specifies the city's involvement in relation to safety and also indicates that citizens are agents of their own safety, notably by means of preventative behaviour.

Beyond this individual participation in safety, the City Council also wanted to make a place for citizens in local consultation and collaboration in public safety. This is one of the objectives pursued by the Policy for a peaceful and safe environment¹⁶, which was adopted in 2007. This policy specifies the municipality's aims in relation to safety and plans the introduction of a local Table for safety in each borough of Montreal and in each of the other towns of the Agglomeration. These local tables, in addition to citizen participation, also rely on the collaboration of the territory's institutions and social, economic and community agents while proposing equal representation of men and women.

Montreal City Council implements many ways to promote the maintenance and development of safe and quality living environments. Municipal actions are in keeping with the results of studies on the success factors. Furthermore, the improvement of the situation over recent years confirms the positive impact of municipal involvement. The City Council must take on the challenge of standing by its aims and of remaining inflexibly involved in promoting safety.

- 5 Montreal City Council: Police Service (2009)
- 6 CIPC, Quebec Observatory on Safety and Prevention. Taking, stocking and analysing the information available on threats to safety in Quebec.
- 7 Gannon and Mihorean (2004)
- 8 Mercer (2010)
- 9 The Service de Police de la Ville de Montréal website: <http://spvm.qc.ca> visited on 31st May 2010
- 10 Ville de Montréal, Service de police (2009)
- 11 Montreal City Council, 2003
- 12 Montreal City Council, 2008
- 13 Montreal City Council, 2002
- 14 IPC, 2007-2009
- 15 Montreal City Council, 2005
- 16 Montreal City Council, 2007

URBAN SECURITY IN LARGE FRENCH METROPOLITAN AREAS

Christophe Soullez
Alain Bauer

Introduction

Up until the 17th century, crime in France primarily occurred in the countryside and was the act of bandits who mainly attacked convoys or travellers, whenever it was not committed by foreign troops who terrorised inhabitants in times of war. Transport routes were insecure and the town, by virtue of the way it was both built and used, was considered a safe and protective place.

In the Middle Ages, towns were fortified, in keeping with the towns built in the time of the Roman Empire which were surrounded by walls to protect against invasions. They played a central role in organising society as a seat of feudal power, but also as a place of refuge in times of troubles or outside attacks for the inhabitants of the surrounding area who served the lord on his fief.

From the year 1000 onwards, demographic growth and increased trade resulted in the revival of towns and their expansion.

The consolidation of royal power in the 12th and 13th centuries reduced clashes between feudal lords, but battles with outside powers took place across the territory, during which deserters and dismissed mercenaries pillaged the lands. It was because of this, in reaction to the growing insecurity in the countryside, that the first police force was created: the Marshalcy which was at that time in charge of controlling and monitoring people involved in war with a remit covering the entire kingdom excluding towns.

With the passing of time, the fortified town (the *bourg* or market town) became too confined and dwellings were built outside the walls and were protected by new outer walls in accordance with a radio-concentric development. Urban fabric became denser, public space

was very restricted and limited to the alleys and some squares. At the same time, towns were facing new problems: hygiene (inexistent sewerage, disease, rats, etc.) and insecurity.

Royal power undertook, initially in Paris, to provide solutions to isolated problems. Thus, in Paris in 1254, Saint-Louis created the knight of the guard (*chevalier du guet*), who was assisted by 20 cavalry sergeants and 26 foot sergeants and was in charge of ensuring the security of Paris at night. The system quickly spread to all towns throughout the kingdom. It would take until 1667, however, for the first veritable police corps to appear in Paris, and later in the provinces, with the creation of the position of Lieutenant general of police. From the 17th century until the beginning of the 20th century, and as a consequence of the growth of towns, the State progressively put in place a police organisation subject to responding to new threats inherent in the development of towns and the evolution of crime.

Thus, while in the Middle Ages those in power were distrusting of the countryside and its inhabitants, who were often quick to rebel through peasant revolts, little by little, towns and their inhabitants were becoming the object of the public authorities' attention and were increasingly perceived as potentially dangerous territories or inhabitant groups. Town inhabitants became subjects to be watched with a view to limiting the possibilities of power being challenged. Furthermore, intelligence services, which had been quite rudimentary up until then, were reinforced and developed under the Consulate and the Empire.

Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the police services, and mainly the public security services, were formed anarchically without any real central organisation. Up until the Vichy regime, every municipality had its own municipal police with the exception of certain municipalities such as Lyon (1851), Marseille (1908), Toulon et la Seyne (1918), Nice (1920), Strasbourg, Metz et Mulhouse (1925), Alger (1930), Toulouse (1940), as well as nineteen municipalities of Seine et Marne and 174 municipalities of Seine et Oise (1935) which, for various historical, political and social reasons, had a State police force.

1. Late state control of town and city police

The Vichy regime, by means of the Law of 23 April 1941, centralised the police services in one regional base to create the first State police. The police was instituted in all of the municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants and in smaller municipalities which had been designated by decree of the Minister of the Interior. Paris maintained its special status with the Prefecture of Police. The

- 1 The Community in Figures (CMM, La Communauté en chiffres), <http://www.cmm.qc.ca> visited on 29th May 2010.
- 2 Montreal City Council: Financial Review (2009)
- 3 Unless otherwise indicated, the statistical data comes from the City Council's Montréal en Statistiques (Montreal in statistics) website http://ville.montreal.qc.ca/portal/page?_pageid=2076,2453845&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL which was visited on May 29th 2010 and whose source is the 2006 Statistics Canada five-year census.
- 4 Collectif quartier, <http://www.collectifquartier.org/atlas/idville/carto.php> Visited on 10th June 2010

police were organised at a regional level, where a prefect was put in charge of the police assisted by a police superintendent and the regional police services. Each administrative political subdivision of the country, known as a department (*département*), comprised a police district, which was managed by a chief district commissioner and subdivided into police wards which were managed by a chief constable or a police superintendent according to their size. Regulations on police civil service were drawn up which made provisions for recruitment based on entrance examinations for the majority and according to qualifications for certain posts.

The system was maintained despite an unsuccessful attempt to return to *the statu quo ante* after France was liberated.

The State regime was then established by the Law of 7 January 1983 which stated that the institution of the State police system was law, as of the 1st January 1985 if the municipal council so requested, in the municipalities with a municipal police force, whenever the conditions regarding workforce, professional qualification or demographic threshold were met.

The Law of 21 January 1995 was completed by regulations which stated that the administrative capitals of departments were to be placed under the State police system (*CGCT, art. R. 2214-1*) and that the State police system could be established in a municipality or in a collection of municipalities forming an urban settlement whenever the following two conditions were met: 1. The population of the municipality or of the collection of municipalities, calculated to include the size of the seasonal population, was over 20,000 inhabitants; 2. The characteristics of crime were the same as those in urban areas.

However, just as the establishing of state control was being facilitated by these various bills, the State police system began to suffer different threats. Indeed, a number of cities with a State police force also had a municipal police force, which created a shortfall in national police force numbers, strong expectations on the inhabitants' behalf with regards to security, or even the need to develop certain missions relinquished by the State police (community policing, surveillance of school entrances and exits, parking police, etc.). The fast development of the municipal police would furthermore lead, in 1999, to political authorities clarifying the remits of this police force with respect to national police and Gendarmerie missions. Subsequently, after 20 years of trial and error, a new police force, the police d'agglomération, began to take shape in Paris and then in the main French urban areas from 2009 onwards.

Nevertheless, in a post-World War II France faced with increasing crime in certain districts, the city was to appear once more as a subject of concern for politicians.

2. French suburbs: at-risk territories

After the Second World War, the urgency for rehousing populations led to a major increase in construction, particularly of large urban housing developments which were concentrated in the outskirts of cities. Despite the high quality of the living conditions offered, this new way of life generated some difficulties. The former inhabitants who had been rehoused in this way witnessed the population of their municipality triple and have its status of small neighbourhood replaced with that of suburb. The new tenants had to conform to the conventions imposed by architecture and community life.

Up until 1974, major economic growth hid the problems which were taking shape both in housing and in the economic and social insertion of the populations living in the large housing developments. The crisis resulting from the rise in oil prices made these problems gradually and successively appear to be on the brink of awakening a feeling of exclusion among a part of the population and of leading to the marginalisation of certain areas. From August 1976 onwards, security became a concern for politicians and, in 1977, Alain Peyrefitte, Minister of Justice, published the report "Responses to violence" which essentially consisted of recommendations and opened up the debate on prevention and repression, giving rise to the passing of the law on "security and freedom".

The first clashes between police forces and youth groups in France kicked off in 1979 in Vaux-en-Velin, with the first burnt-out cars making headline news. The events that took place in the residential area of Minguettes in Vénissieux in 1981, however, were the first to receive large scale media coverage. The reason behind those riots was the social rebellion of young people from the disadvantaged areas of the suburbs of Lyon and the refusal to accept discrimination and living conditions which were deemed unbearable. These riots were therefore considered the expression of political and social demands.

Following the discussions around the passing of the law on "security and freedom"¹, the change in government in 1981 contributed to the emergence of a prevention policy which was characterised by an essentially social approach to tackling crime. The law gave rise notably to the creation of the first partnership schemes between the State and public bodies as well as to the first measures of what would later officially be termed "Urban Policy".

The 1980s were marked by the increase of incidents between young people and the police in disadvantaged areas. A new peak of violence was reached in the early 1990s. The town of Vaux-en-Velin experienced new riots following the death of a motorbike passenger in a police roadblock. The media immediately made the connection with the events of 1981. Following these riots, the Prime Minister was appointed Ministerial Delegate for Urban Affairs by President François Mitterrand, followed by the first thirteen sub-prefects being appointed delegates for Urban Affairs. In 1991, clashes spread to many towns in the Parisian region. Then, throughout the entire decade of the 1990s, numerous municipalities were becoming regular stages for clashes between the police forces and the young inhabitants of disadvantaged districts. In Autumn 2005, France experienced a wave of riots in a great many suburban areas following the tragic accidental death of two minors who hid in an electrical transformer to avoid a police check. The state of emergency, which had not been needed since the Algerian War, was declared on the 8th November 2005 and was extended for a period of three months. These acts of violence, which essentially took the shape of arson and stone-throwing at the police forces, became, in certain cases, riots pitting hundreds of people in the disadvantaged districts against the police forces. Then, in November 2007, two young men in Villiers-le Bel were hit by a police car patrolling the district and died. In response to this, the police station was besieged and set on fire. The clashes lasted two nights and it was the first time ever that offenders in these types of protests used firearms.

Numerous districts were routinely experiencing peaks in tension and witnessing confrontation between the police forces and young people, while young people from different districts were not engaging in conflicts over territory or, more mundanely, to protect trafficking and criminal activity.

3. The poorest territories are the most at-risk

Most urban acts of violence are carried out in the districts classified as disadvantaged urban zones (ZUS, *zones urbaines sensibles*). Hence, if attacks on property recorded in ZUS in 2008 were 15% lower than those recorded in the law enforcement district (CSP, *circonscription de sécurité publique*), attacks on people were slightly more common in these areas (12.2 per 1,000 inhabitants in comparison with 11.4 per 1,000 in their CSP). Nevertheless, the ZUS are more at-risk for certain crimes, such as arson attacks on private property, where the rate of acts recorded per inhabitant is twice as high as those committed in the CSP to which

they belong. There is also a higher risk for other acts of destruction and damage.

In addition, according to the results of the crime victimisation survey “Cadre de Vie et Sécurité” carried out by the ONDRP and the INSEE in 2009, ZUS inhabitants gave number one rankings to problems such as the area’s bad image and crime. In January 2009, more than half of these stated that their district was affected by these problems (12% and 26% of households for the other districts of the same suburbs or towns). A feeling of not being safe is also more present in these areas: in January 2009, 25% of ZUS inhabitants stated that they often or occasionally felt insecure in their district, and 13% in their home, whereas these figures are 14% and 8% for the inhabitants of other districts of the same suburbs or towns².

Beyond the administrative statistics on crimes and offences recorded by the police services and the Gendarmerie units, the results of the “Cadre de Vie et Sécurité” survey reveal that ZUS inhabitants suffer a larger number of attacks than the inhabitants of other districts. Throughout the course of 2007 and 2008, inhabitants from these districts aged 14 years and over were the victims of 14 incidents of theft involving violence per 1,000 inhabitants (6 per 1,000 for the inhabitants of other districts in the same suburbs or towns). The number of acts of physical violence suffered by these inhabitants rose to 132 per 1,000 (111 per 1,000 for the inhabitants of other districts). In addition, they are much more often witnesses to acts of violence, of crime or of destruction and damage to community facilities (51% compared to 24% in other areas).

The public security issue in France is therefore concentrated in almost 700 districts which are to a large extent spread out over the outskirts of large cities. Public authorities, therefore, need to establish a policy aiming at preventing the phenomena of “acts of urban violence”, but also define a security strategy which is based on the fight against the underground economy and illegal trafficking which are at the very heart of the marginalisation process of disadvantaged districts.

4. Turf wars

When defining strategies, public security in major French cities involves above all recognising the territory and how it is used by certain young people.

Territory is a unifying element. The estate, the district, serves as a reference and means of identification for many young people (who get older over time). Young people form groups in the space around the estate which may become, if necessary, the site of conflict as well

as the object of what is at stake. This is a phenomenon which is associated with territorialisation and a form of tribalisation and leads to conflict between social order and an “other” order: that of the district.

Territory equally leads to strong solidarity among inhabitants, particularly among young people, living in the same district or block of flats. Such is the nature of this solidarity and identification with the territory that it leads to an appropriation of public space.

Urban crime therefore takes on an indisputable territorial dimension. Thus, the cause of numerous acts is the defence of the territory from intruders. This defence becomes a reality in the form of the rejection of all those who do not belong to the district and of an extreme solidarity between young people from the same district. If a young person is reprimanded by the police forces or by youths from other districts, regardless of the nature of the acts, the youths from the same district will immediately come to the “rescue”.

Lastly, the methods of appropriation of the territory by traffickers can equally explain the concentration of illegal activities in certain hands. In the districts where a gang leader system is gradually established, the will to control the whole of a district or an estate can only be realised by acquiring a maximum number of local trafficking operations. Potential competition is thus neutralised and the constitution of an extensive client network represents the certainty of controlling the territory for the gang leader while benefiting from a certain level of protection provided by the inhabitants. The representation of the places concerned and the way in which the spaces in estates are used socially are gradually structured by the economy of trafficking operations, especially that of drug-trafficking. In many districts, entire areas of the space (pavements, alleyways, walkways etc.) are thus monopolised by the traffickers. These phenomena of territorial appropriation then become increasingly difficult to reverse and thus contribute to stigmatising the districts.

5. Territories structured around trafficking

Interpenetration between the levels of engagement in crime is more commonly observed in certain districts. It is as if a type of economic integration and distribution of work were being established among the major traffickers and the more petty delinquents. Hardened traffickers no longer hesitate in lending drugs or money to local delinquents so they may “set up” small deals, in return for the support of these “helping hands” with their own delivery, lookout or intimidation operations.

A rather sizeable diffusion of techniques, which were until then reserved for the bigger criminals, ensues from these exchanges: use of location scouting, of techniques to overcome police observation or tailing, of fake identity documents, of blackmail or of retaliatory acts of punishment which are sometimes barbarous.

Furthermore, these mutations within crime are often part and parcel of a strategy of appropriation and territorial defence which aims to either protect the activity of the groups practising it through the existence of a concealed support base or to guarantee them an outlet market for the proceeds of certain theft or trafficking operations.

The use of violence as an instrument for controlling trafficking operations, the growing use of firearms and attack dogs, the increase in the amount of score-settling between dealers as well as increased attacks, sometimes planned, on the police force, have become the elements of a will to make sanctuaries of certain territories for traffickers. The latter are also skilfully capable of buying support or neutrality by providing smaller helpers with payment or “redistributional” profit-sharing.

For this reason, it is becoming increasingly complex to analyse and interpret certain events which constitute a disturbance of public order and which are all too often termed “urban violence”.

In numerous cases, the burning of vehicles belongs to a “ludic”, “mimetic” or sometimes “anti-establishment” retaliatory crime. But such a staging, however, can also serve as a convenient smoke screen for the will to cover up all usable traces following a car theft operation, or to mask insurance fraud. Setting rubbish bins, letter boxes or basements on fire sometimes constitute bullying or acts of intimidation or revenge on residents who would be likely to oppose the development of trafficking operations or to act as police witnesses. Lastly, violent turbulence also frequently comes into play in “acts of retaliation” following a police investigation operation as a means of pressurising the local area and dissuading the authorities from launching similar future operations.

The use of violence for controlling trafficking operations brushes aside the utopian dimension that characterised the practices regarding communitarian space (squatting, communes) and drugs in the wake of “May ‘68”. The consolidation of certain trafficking operations in given territories generates specific types of violence which are very difficult to control. The rooting of trafficking operations in a given district, having reached a certain level of sophistication, generates acts of violence which are linked to increasing trade tensions

between all of the trafficking agents or to their need to defend their territory.

The trafficker's main resource is much more connected to the territory than to the product itself. That is the reason for trafficking being very fragmented and in the hands of a large diversity of gangs and districts, or more precisely of district gangs. While North or South American gangs often look to spread their influence and their activities beyond their original territory, in France district gangs generally look to limit themselves to their territory or even to get hold of another estate's resale network, but only if that estate is situated nearby and its network is weak, for example, if all its leaders have been imprisoned. Therefore, resellers' actions are in line with a rationale of securing business around the points of sale that they control. Therefore, the set-up is such that it is the client who comes to the trafficker and not the other way round, leading to a major flow of activity in the district and promoting the fragmentation of trade into multiple independent small structures. Once trafficking is more organised, once it is structured around one or two families or brotherhoods, we then go from a gang rationale to the more classic crime rationale. For the specialised services of the national police, there is a distinction to be made between estate gangs who organise trafficking within their estate and trafficking gangs, those classic networks whose main concern is importation. In the latter's case, the gang is cemented by members belonging to the same ethnic group or having got to know each other in prison, rather than by the geographical rationale. It is particularly in these situations that certain districts which appear relatively quiet are victims of the dominance of delinquent gangs, having chosen to "keep the peace" instead of providing the police services with specific reasons to intervene.

The increase in the number of networks also makes it more difficult for the judicial services to act, as they have to fight against the small gangs which are easily replaced, as opposed to a more elaborate structure which is easily thrown off balance.

6. New urban risks

Confrontations or encounters between gangs sometimes take place outside of the home territory of gang members and in neutral areas such as stations, shopping centres, concert arenas, discos, public transport, etc. These areas are used just as much for carrying out "shady affairs" as for the immediate settling of these. They may even involve certain schools if the selection of places respects a certain geographical diversity. Random clashes regularly take place at concerts or other social events where young people meet. Yet at these

"neutral" places, events unfold according to rationales which are different from those that govern in the estate. It is the ill-timed encounter or an initiating act which will trigger the clash without there being any premeditation: a sideways glance between two youth gangs, the end of a concert, a police check, (the triggering element of the events at the Gare du Nord in Paris in April 2007). Clashes between gangs or with the police in thoroughfares take place according to numerous random factors, which actually limits the number of them and consequently makes it much more difficult for the police forces to anticipate or intervene in them.

Public space is also a place of expression and protest. Long ago, a well-established tradition made it possible for a partially organised confrontation to oppose the central peace-keeping services of the unions and the law enforcement forces. The last case of this was at the time of the very violent steelworkers' protest in 1979. From the student protests of 1986 onwards, the appearance of a "cluster" in front of the police services front line attacking the police forces before taking shelter within the crowd of protesters was being recorded. The high school students' protests in April 1990 were characterised by numerous clashes with the law enforcement forces and the ransacking of several shops. Again, in 1994, during the protests against the work insertion contract (CIP, *Contrat d'Insertion Professionnelle*), "rioters" used the protests to loot shops before taking refuge in the crowd of protesters, making intervention very difficult for the law enforcement forces. The targets had been clearly identified (the shops), the objectives set (looting) and the clashes with the police forces limited. From 2005 (protests against the Fillon law) onwards, the same delinquents were also attacking the protesters themselves. Rioter violence was thus moving up a notch.

An accumulation of three types of operations riding on protests was therefore being observed: operations against the law enforcement forces and public buildings, against shops and against the protesters, which was particularly visible during the protests against the First Employment Contract (CPE, *Contrat Première Embauche*) in 2006. Youth gangs, coming predominantly from the disadvantaged districts of the Parisian suburbs, directly attacked other young people, mugging them while within the crowd itself. On 23rd March 2006, at the height of the movement, close to 2,000 particularly violent delinquents came up against the police forces while wrecking certain businesses and attacking young protesters.

Public authorities are increasingly faced with new uses of public space and of the temporary privatisation of these for new

types of groupings or gatherings. The development of information technologies as well as social networks has recently led to the phenomenon of mass social gatherings which are characterised by their illegality as well as by their way of bursting into urban spaces (flash-mobs, parties in the underground, Facebook parties, etc.). Beyond the purely juridical matters regarding their legality, these gatherings of a new kind pose public order and security problems. How do you handle tens of thousands of people, often young people, never having met before, who gather spontaneously in a public space without being able, as in the majority of cases, to identify the person in charge of the event? Furthermore, the prospect of the appearance of violent, delinquent or terrorist flash-mobs is not just a mere high-school hypothesis. The use of technologies enables anonymity, group mobilisation and coordination without any direct links. Terrorist action could thus go from being a system of cells and closed networks to an open and virtual system before proceeding to the act. Similarly, there is nothing to hinder the development of delinquent flash-mobs, as was the case on the 2nd June 2009 in Philadelphia, when dozens of young people responded to a meeting at a community site aiming to ransack a petrol station. One must also bear in mind the possibility of clashes between the pacifists attending these new gatherings and certain delinquent gangs, who use the same means of mobilisation to engage in attacks while benefiting from anonymity and the diversity of the targets.

The democratisation of public transport, the advent of a consumer and leisure society and the moving of numerous economic poles have considerably modified urban space and have increased the exchange of people between the centres and peripheral areas of large cities. Transport networks have become the vehicles as well as the zones of crime. Flow management and control represents a veritable challenge for public authorities.

7. (Over-) Diversified public policies

France has responded to the development of urban insecurity with approaches that have varied considerably over the course of the past thirty years.

After the sometimes ridiculous discussions around the passing of the law on "security and freedom", the change of government in 1981 contributed to the emergence of a prevention policy which was characterised by an essentially social approach to tackling crime. The founding of the National Committee for the Social Development of Districts (CNDSQ, *Commission Nationale pour le Développement Social des Quartiers*) and of the mayors committee for security,

termed the “Bonnemaïson” committee, gave rise to the establishment of local and departmental councils for the prevention of crime (CCPD, *Conseils Communaux et Départementaux de Prévention de la Délinquance*) that were in charge of developing partnerships and implementing actions for improving the daily living of the inhabitants of disadvantaged districts.

Then, at the beginning of the 1990s, urban policy, which until then had been working towards the social development of districts, experienced a significant change of course, as seen in the context of increased unemployment and urban problems. The actions and discussions of 1990 as well as the president of the Republic’s speech at the “Banlieue 89” conference in Bron led to the appointment of a minister of state in charge of urban policy on the 21st December 1990 and to the appointment of 13 sub-prefects in charge of urban policy missions in January 1991.

This “urban policy” aimed at improving inhabitants’ living conditions using numerous and diverse actions ranging from housing rehabilitation to the promotion of local associative life and including the development of leisure facilities for young people or the setting up of specific schemes which promoted employment access for young people. All of these measures, as well as the sums of money allocated to them over the past thirty years, were to contribute to lowering crime and curbing urban violence, according to the creators of this new doctrine.

Throughout the course of the past thirty years, this policy has known many variations: from the Conventions for the Social Development of Districts (CDSQ, *Conventions Développement Social des Quartiers*) to the Urban Agreements for Social Unity (CUCS, *Contrats Urbain de Cohésion Sociale*) with the City Contracts (*Contrats de Ville*), the measures of the City Revitalisation Pact (*Pacte de Relance pour la Ville*) in 1996, the creation of the disadvantaged urban zones, the urban re-stimulation zones or the tax exempt urban zones and the Pact for Suburban Hopes (*Pacte Espoirs Banlieue*) in 2008 coming somewhere in between, and not forgetting the creation of the National Agency for Urban Renovation (ANRU, *l’Agence Nationale de la Rénovation Urbaine*) in 2004, the Agency for Social Unity and Equal Opportunities (ACSE, *l’Agence de la Cohésion Sociale et l’Égalité des Chances*) in 2006, the implementation in 2007 of the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime (CIPD, *Comité Interministériel de Prévention de la Délinquance*), etc.

Schemes and laws have stacked up without any assessment. Territories which are (positively) discriminated

against have increased in number and there has been a major increase in the sums allocated, despite it being very difficult to fully comprehend the amount of money dedicated to this policy. But all of this was carried out without much consistency, with allocations and subsidies inextricably overlapping or piling up to the point that one could use the expression “jungle of grants and aids”³.

If urban policy has made it possible to forge partnerships which didn’t exist beforehand, its impact in other domains, notably in the field of crime prevention, has been very limited. Moreover, it has often been implemented too late, when problems have already reached the point of no return and intervention is therefore much more difficult.

Reservations and inertia remain excessively present in an urban policy which appeals to goodwill in areas where it often needs to impose. This is a domain where the State should be strong, abstaining from vain boasting, while showing a good example by establishing its services at the heart of the difficult estates. This requires putting a price on it, including in the area of agent remuneration, by breaking, quite significantly for those affected, from the perpetual rule of equality of all civil servants. The latter, often young and from the countryside, sometimes only think about one thing: leaving again. It is possible to motivate them to come and stay by means of faster promotion, subsequent bonuses, provision of (decent) accommodation, and this could even “produce” volunteers. In return, an assessment of their involvement and of their results should be implemented. The State should take the liberty of being able to select all of its civil servants who are to work in the most disadvantaged areas, at all levels of the hierarchy. The solution to the most difficult problems lies in exceptional solutions.

Over the past ten years, the State has also been seeking to develop situational prevention by accelerating in particular the use of video protection in public transport as well as in public areas⁴.

Likewise, aware that urban planning could be a risk factor, the law on the organisation of security passed in 1995 made provision for an especially detailed study on public security to be carried out for all amenities submitted for planning permission which, “by their size, location or their characteristics, could impact on the protection of people and property”. This pioneering measure is actually fraught with consequences. Apart from making this study a factual issue for planning permission, it assumes that the applicant has the relevant expertise or resources to carry it out, and that State agents have the training needed to deliver an opinion based on the studies

performed. The law on crime prevention of 5 March 2007 enabled article 111-3-1 of the Building and Urban Land Use Code to be adapted to the changes in urban development law and to the practices of land developers. Thus, the new drafting of this article aimed to promote talks between project developers, public authorities and those involved in community work. The procedure arranged for a systematic review of the preliminary public security study (EPSP, *étude préalable de sécurité publique*) by a departmental commission. It took, however, 12 years for the implementing decrees to finally be published⁵.

8. Evolving police strategies

In addition to reinforcing the investigative ability of police forces and creating new penal charges, which aim to take into further consideration the development of urban crime phenomena, such as the recent phenomenon gang participation, public authorities have also sought to adapt police organisation to changes in crime.

Two emblematic reforms exemplify this will. The first, implemented in 2002, aims to tackle the underground economy more effectively, which is corrupting many districts, by creating new police investigation units: the regional intervention groups (GIR, *groupes d’intervention régionaux*). The GIR’s mission is to fight against the underground economy and the various forms of organised crime. In Metropolitan France, there are 29 GIRs, 21 of which have their remit within the jurisdiction of an administrative region and 8 of which are attached to the Île de France region and have a departmental remit. The GIRs are made up of police and gendarme officers as well as customs and tax officers and agents from the economic competition services. They act mainly with a view to uncovering the networks at work in the estates.

In September 2009, a protocol signed between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance also planned the assignment of the tax service officers specifically to monitoring the districts in which the underground economy thrives. This mainly involves detecting outward signs of the local gang leaders’ wealth and of confronting them about their tax declarations and possibly about suspect bank transactions.

The objective of the second reform, implemented in September 2009 as part of the “Greater Paris” reform, is to adapt the organisation of the Parisian police to the scope of the crime pool of Greater Paris. A new urban police force, the police d’agglomération, was therefore created by extending the remit of the Police Headquarters (Préfecture de Police) beyond inner-city Paris⁶. Since

then, the Police Headquarters has been leading and coordinating the fight against crime in Paris and in three departments of the outer suburban area (92, 93 and 94) which has 6.4 million inhabitants. This reform should make it possible to pool the units so as to offer support to the territorial units within the framework for creating intervention forces that can be quickly mobilised and deployed. Bearing in mind the mobility of crime and gangs, as well as the attraction of Paris, the act of sharing all information and operational intelligence obtained by the various intelligence services will likely help to list and monitor gang movements. At the criminal investigation level, "estate" groups have been created in Paris, in the Hauts-de-Seine and Val-de-Marne areas⁷, so as to better identify all of the members of a trafficking operation. Other French cities will shortly adopt an identical organisation.

Thus, the city will no longer be the place for crime, but the place of the police. From the faubourgs of yesteryear to the suburbs of today, urban balance depends on the connection between the city-centre and its periphery.

- 1 The discussions regarding Law no. 81-82 of 2 February 1981, which reinforced security and protected people's freedom, had seen the defenders of a repressive policy and those who favoured a more global approach to delinquency pitted against each other.
- 2 See Masurel (2009).
- 3 See the Court of Auditors' report, *La politique de la ville (Urban policy)*, February 2002.
- 4 See Bauer & Souleze (2009) and Bauer & Freynet (2009).
- 5 Decree no. 2007-1177 of 3 August 2007
- 6 Decree no. 2009-898 of 24 July and Order of 9 August 2009
- 7 There was already one in Seine-Saint-Denis.

CONCLUSIONS

PUBLIC SAFETY FROM A METROPOLITAN PERSPECTIVE: THE CASE OF BARCELONA

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1. Public safety, a metropolitan problem

To speak of common spaces is to speak of safety. In recent years, everybody has assumed -to a greater or lesser degree- that entering and leaving these spaces means exposure to a wide range of risks, from rudeness to threats or robberies and even violence. We have also learned -with greater or lesser success- to protect ourselves in these situations. The response generally depends on the resources of the legal system and, above all, of the police. After all, it is the responsibility of the

police forces to establish surveillance and prevention strategies so that crime does not happen. There is a conviction that protecting public safety and exercising public freedoms are basic requirements for coexistence in a democratic society¹. Although we all recognise the professionalism of our police force and their dedication, it is also increasingly clear that the population's needs with regard to public safety are more extensive. It is necessary therefore, to use more resources than those which are strictly dissuasive.

In recent years, this issue has aroused great interest and made many a pen run dry. It starts from the confirmation that insecurity depend both on real and definite exposure to different manifestations of crime (criminal rates measured by experts) and the way that people live safely together and interact in public spaces. Thus and foremost, it is important to tackle the spatial dimension of safety, because the physical design of spaces can generate insecurity. We all agree that dark and narrow alleys and deserted corners where few people pass by can make us feeling insecure. A long tradition of analysis -from situational criminology to theory on defensible spaces, etc.- has also proven that lighting, upkeep of facilities, their ability to be adapted to different uses and users, thus favouring group appropriation, and avoiding degeneration and vandalism, are all factors that decisively effect the way in which safety and security are attributed to certain spaces.

Secondly, the social dimension of safety. In an urban world like the present one, the history of the city is largely the history of society. However, if urban life is in itself the cause of many positive factors, it paradoxically also generates negative ones, including insecurity. At this point, in the terrain of misunderstandings, there is a big one that must be corrected. It consists of considering that greater quotas of urban wellbeing lead, like a magic trick or a medical cure, to more safety. Since the time cities were first founded, they saw the convergence of both the wealthy and the poor and, consequently, the problems and conflicts that this proximity cannot help but engender². On the street or in the park, the presence of people whose behaviour disturbs or bothers us, especially if they act as if they owned these spaces and make us feel unwelcome in a public space, generates bewilderment and discomfort. They can even cause fear, particularly if these people form part of the collective imagination of danger shared by a majority of the population. Then it is the same whether they experienced a threat, an attack or not, if a criminal event occurred or not, because the feeling of insecurity and risk increases among people who live there.

1.1 The study of public safety in Barcelona and its metropolitan area

From the above, we can deduce that managing public safety is a complex social policy. Aware of this reality, in 1983 the mayor of Barcelona, Pasqual Maragall, established the Technical Committee on Urban Security. Its objective was to create a programme to define basic action areas and propose measures for effective action that the government team could undertake. After 14 months of work, the committee drew up conclusions and several proposals. The final document concluded that the information available in this area represented little more than an initial approach. Thus, it proposed initiating a serious research and study policy framed within global policy on public safety³.

The *Victimisation Survey and Opinion on Safety in Barcelona* was published in this setting. This study has been performed annually and continuously since 1984, giving rise to one of the most extensive analytical report series on urban security ever drawn up by a local government⁴. The survey was, and is, much more than a mere intellectual operation. It is an excellent tool for well-informed and decentralised political management. Its fundamental objective is to study the distribution of crime and the feeling of safety at a city-wide scope. Inequalities in its territorial shape are understood to be associated with the social differences and different uses of the neighbourhoods and districts (the different appropriation of the city by different social classes).

However, nearly 30 years have passed since the committee's work started. Throughout this period of time, cities have accrued decades of population and activity growth that have made them increasingly larger, as they have developed according to the social needs at any given time. In this process, Barcelona has become the central hub of the continuous city that we know today as the Barcelona Metropolitan Area (BMA). A space has sprung up around it formed of functional relationships, of urban concurrence, of the shared use of supplies and services. All this lets us speak of a differentiated and unique environment with special features and specific needs⁵.

With an area of 636 km² and a population of 3,218,071 inhabitants⁶, the 36 municipalities make up a metropolitan area that is ranked among the most densely populated urban agglomerates in Europe with 5060 inhabitants per km². Life in the BMA is dense due to the concentrated population, and it is also mobile. There is a daily interchange of jobs, education, culture, commerce and leisure between the towns in this bustling mass, which make this territorial reality a dynamic, interactive and highly-heterogeneous space.

All together, this means that a large part of the urban relations that used to take place within one town, have now extended throughout the metropolitan area. Cities grow socially and economically and are experienced beyond their administrative limits. The urban sprawl, along with the new relational and mobility models, also changes criminal patterns. On the one hand, the appearance of new centralities and poles of attraction means that, during peak transit times when there are a large number of people around, the chances, opportunities and numbers of potential victims all multiply. On the other hand, each metropolitan city is the setting for criminal incidents that affect, not only the residents of the municipality, but also the inhabitants of neighbouring towns.

Thus, the city and the different territories surrounding it have started to economically and functionally merge. Now there is an urban entity, not only inter-municipal, but trans-territorial⁷. This statement is also valid with regard to safety, so that a proper analysis of public safety must today be framed in the context of the metropolitan reality. Sensitive to this situation, the Barcelona City Council made the wealth of knowledge it gathered over the years available to the BMA Community of Municipalities⁸. In 1989, it decided to expand the scope of operation of the victimisation survey to include all BMA municipalities⁹. The study of victimisation in metropolitan terms must enable the detection of inequalities and differences in safety that are not explained by analysing concrete cases at a municipal level.

The *Victimisation Survey in Barcelona Metropolitan Area* (EVAMB) has been carried out annually since 1990. It provides data both about the objective state of security (the exposure of citizens to the different manifestations of crime and the process of reporting these acts) and their subjective experiences (citizens' assessments about safety in their neighbourhoods and municipalities). Concretely, victimisation is studied (amount of population who have been victims of a criminal act in one of six groups of type of crimes⁹) and the perception of safety of BMA inhabitants by gender, age groups, educative and economic background and by territories. Twenty straight years of analysis provide a chance to empirically observe and dynamically study change processes in the state of public safety in the BMA, providing understanding about its development. It proves that the unequal impact of safety problems in the metropolitan region uphold typical patterns. They are distributed geographically, travelling along centralities and according to the logic of urbanising transformations that modify population structures (composition and size).

2. Development and status of public safety in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area

Two issues on public safety must be clearly differentiated: one, a real and definite exposure to different manifestations of criminal activity and two, the social construction of feeling safe, both with respect to conclusions and how they are dealt with. BMA changes in these 20 years have continued to modify and rewrite the criminal and safety landscape with which neighbours coexist.

2.1 Trends of crime

According to EVAMB data, victimisation in the metropolitan area since 1989 has been rising, with some stabilisation from 2004 to 2008. In 2009, the trend changed and the stability of past years was interrupted by an increase in the victimisation index (the percentage of the population that has been a victim of crime), up to 22.3%, the highest rate seen in the entire series (see figure 1).

With regard to the different crimes studied in the survey, the most victimisation occurs in the area of personal security (robberies, hold ups, assaults). Over the years, these have been replacing crimes involving vehicles as the area with the highest victimisation. Crimes against homes are less frequent and the population's exposure to crimes affecting shops and businesses, second homes and agricultural products are even lower.

The highest victimisation in the area of personal security results from non-violent acts: robbery, of handbags, purses or mobile phones, is the most frequent crime in this area. Appropriation of goods by any degree of violence affects less people. The most frequent acts involving vehicles are also the least serious: stealing objects from inside vehicles as well as theft of vehicle accessories. Bicycle and scooter thefts are more frequent than car theft.

In a context of demographic growth and the increased density of BMA municipalities, criminal activity is growing, as there are a larger number of people liable to be victimised. Thus, population variations, both increases and losses of inhabitants, must be a variable that is considered when adapting citizen protection systems.

Changes to demographic structure also influence the relationship that citizens have with safety. Thus, in the period between 2003 and 2009, increased victimisation was detected among the elderly in the BMA. Traditionally fairly untouched by crime, the larger demographic pre-eminence of the elderly sector, along with longer life expectancy

and better quality of life, all contribute to their greater vulnerability to crime. In this process, adolescents have also emerged as a group that is particularly vulnerable to new types of crime. They have even overtaken adults as the group that is most exposed to the risk of victimisation. Demographic changes have also contributed to increasing ethnic diversity. Growth in the foreign-nationality population in the BMA has gone hand-in-hand with significant increases in criminal activity. With extremely-high victimisation indexes, these increases are closely related to these groups' great vulnerability to crime.

The tertiarisation of employment and the corporate fabric in the BMA's municipalities have been accompanied by increases in criminal activity. On the one hand, labour market and gender role changes have had an influence on the increased victimisation of women, today comparable to that of men. On the other hand, the creation of new companies and the diversification of the offering of services modify the territorial patterns for the distribution of crime, because the centrality and overcrowding of the territory entail a greater number of opportunities, higher guarantee of anonymity and, above all, the possibility for criminals to obtain economies of scale. In parallel, the population's mobility patterns and the functional specialisation of the metropolitan area also exercise an unequal attraction over criminal activity. Depending on the activities carried out there, crime is concentrated particularly in commercial zones, hubs of services, businesses, etc¹⁰.

In summary, the majority of crimes that affect the metropolitan population correspond to different types of predatory crime (against personal security and vehicles) or, in other words, utilitarian, seeking to appropriate a piece of property or obtain economic benefit without violence and with the least cost possible for the offender. These are quick actions, with the majority happening on streets, generally without violence. These factors all make it extremely difficult to apprehend the offenders.

2.2 Trends of opinion on safety

EVAMB figures, one of the only tools that lets us study how safe the general population feels, reveal that the perception of the level of safety in the territory, both with respect to the neighbourhood where they live and the city as a whole, has been gradually improving –in general terms- throughout all BMA municipalities. The highest levels of safety are currently perceived in small and medium-sized municipalities and, conversely, the lowest levels are attributed to the largest municipalities (Badalona, Barcelona, L'Hospitalet de Llobregat and Santa Coloma de Gramenet).

The successive transformations of the BMA have continued to modify coexistence patterns and the feeling of safety among the population. At the end of the 80s, safety levels were quite low, coinciding with the era in which democratic town councils started to design and implement their prevention policies. Starting at that time, the feeling of safety started to progressively increase, until it reached its maximum values from 1998 to 2001. With the start of the new century and, after years of continued improvement, the perception of safety levels in metropolitan neighbourhoods and cities started to drop slightly, in parallel with an important period of social transformations (see figure 2).

The demographic growth of cities was characterised by an increase in elderly as well as infant and juvenile populations; an increase and diversification of foreigners, with a particularly heavy influx in recent years; large-scale urban planning operations and initiatives, which transformed the metropolitan landscape; the consolidation of the metropolitan area as a city of flows more than a grouping of towns. All together, these factors have contributed to changing -at times expected and involuntarily at other times- coexistence and relational patterns between citizens and their territory and, most importantly, had important consequences for public safety.

The *2009 Report on the State of Safety in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area*¹¹ set forth some of the factors that may have contributed to some increase in the perception of insecurity in the metropolitan area and an increase in coexistence tensions. Based on the analysis of the information on the changes undergone in the midst of the metropolitan area in the last period, some metropolitan processes were deemed to have significantly influenced the feeling of safety and processes of getting along in the BMA.

An increased number of victimisations is logically a key element contributing to this feeling of danger. Thus, the perception that the safety level has worsened grows in line with victimisation indexes. The increase in crime has thus been one of the factors that have contributed to generating insecurity among residents of the BMA in the period from 2003 to 2009.

The perception of a lack of safety is similarly the result of other factors, such as the social use of spaces. Analyses show that the feeling of not being safe grows as soon as the territory starts to be viewed as a problematic space in which to live, whether this is due to deterioration in the social conditions of the residential environment (incivility) or due to forced coexistence with the *other* (from another group, causing fear). Segregated and abandoned spaces also

tend to be perceived as unsafe, or those that are difficult to territorialise as our own. Thus, as territories stop becoming hubs or stop attracting population flows, there is an analogous increase in the number of people who state that they feel unsafe there. Conversely, as territories gain in centrality, the feeling of worsening safety also decreases.

3. Managing public safety in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area

Metropolises are more than a conglomerate of people, streets and buildings. They are the system of social relationships entailed in the inhabitants' process of living there. The trends observed in the metropolitan area in its recent history verify considerable development. We are faced with a metropolitan society that is very consolidated, but which has to confront the changes experienced in many of the structures that underpin it and that have characterised it up until now. Metropolitan demographic and productive dynamics have changed and new social and cultural expectations have arisen.

People change and urban spaces change and with them, the phenomenology of public safety changes. New situations appear that turn into problems of coexistence with neighbours and their use of common areas (which are limited and have become one of the main sources of conflict among citizens and therefore one of the main sources of the perception of insecurity). Thus, coexistence emerges as one of the key factors in the feeling of wellbeing and, inseparably, also of safety. The study of the influence of these transformations, as far as our data permits, shows that the present metropolitan processes pose a series of specific challenges for managing public safety in upcoming years.

3.1 Preventing crime

With the aim of reducing the crime that has been shown to be more widespread and rampant in metropolitan areas, it is advisable to prioritise a concerted and sustained action over time aimed at significantly reducing 'petty crime' (theft, robbery, assault, etc.) throughout the metropolitan area, in particular where the majority of these crimes take place. The security forces are responsible for developing the required strategies that, from proximity, knowledge and adaptation to the territory, substantially improve the efficacy and efficiency of regulatory, police and legal strategies when reducing the most pernicious effects of criminal activity in the BMA and on the transport network and communication routes that uphold it.

Municipalities, especially those with local police competence, must mutually

help each other to correct territorial imbalances and collaborate with their neighbours to protect citizens from the effects of crimes that, like the rest of daily activities, exceed administrative limits. The effective fight against crime and the reduction of public worry has to be compatible with policies centred on improving the feeling of safety by promoting coexistence and minimising the conflicts that are manifest in the use of public spaces and the urban setting.

3.2 Governing insecurity

Without prejudice to policies and initiatives to fight crime, we must be aware that public safety policies must principally heed concerns about safety that emerge as a relatively recent product of social and political evolution in our societies. Up until recently people normally assumed that the measures to control crime were also the best strategy for reducing fear and insecurity. However, today many demands for safety that reach the authorities and local governments have less to do with increased thefts and robberies and more to do with an increase in requests for protection in daily conflicts that emerge in our daily lives. Noise, bad smells and fights between neighbours or the simple presence of groups of people in public spaces who bother others or act in ways that are considered 'inappropriate' are, to cite just a couple examples, situations that worry citizens.

These are social insecurities and fears that, despite encompassing the real fear of becoming the victim of a personal assault (above all via robbery or attacks against personal security), intervene directly in citizens' right to peaceful and safe coexistence. The priority task must thus consist of reformulating the problem of public safety and insecurity in terms that make it possible to confront them without unsustainable costs to freedom and justice. This requires modifying the conditions that produce the fears that arise during coexistence.

For any public policy that proposes decriminalising conflict and solving local safety problems, it is essential to put an end to reducing safety policies to simple policies to exercise control and to redefine public safety, adding the concern for safety to the set of public policies -economic, social, educational, cultural, urban planning- that drive the different governments. When defining safety policies, new social players must be incorporated and the policies must be extended to new areas of group action, as the complexity of the phenomenon requires an integral and comprehensive focus.

Safety is a challenge that involves quality of life and the BMA is prepared to confront it, in the framework of its competences, via local support policies

to promote coexistence¹². Policies to increase urban security encompass initiatives that range from restoration, renovation and maintenance of public spaces to introducing elements of centrality and invigorating common-use spaces. This is not the place to make a dissertation about the value of public space to dissuade criminal behaviour. However, it is appropriate to stress the importance that defending the urban environment against assaults likely to detract its value has for safety. Faced with closure techniques –based on designing spaces around specific services so that its inhabitants go to it and watch over them, as well as the search for order via supervising flows, making people circulate to prevent undesired encounters- it is important to point out that it is possible to ‘secure’ spaces used by everyone by opening them up to social life and relations, creating new spaces and making existing ones more accessible and pleasant to everybody, favouring group appropriation¹⁴.

While the spatial handling of security is indeed important, the social dimension of public safety must also be strengthened, working to reduce criminogenic and fear-inducing effects of our common lives. Urban development through economic revitalisation of neighbourhoods and suitable regulation on land uses to promote balance between housing, living, commerce, work and leisure zones, in short, to prevent ghettoisation and the concentration of risk factors that lead to insecurity, are all key factors.

1 Organic Law 1/1992 of 21 February on Protecting Public Safety (Official Journal no. 46 of 22 February).

2 Donzelot (2007).

3 Barcelona City Council (1986).

4 For further information, consult Sabaté (2005).

5 Law 31/2010 of the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona. DOGC 5708, 6th August 2010.

6 http://www.amb.cat/web/mmamb/estudis_territorials/indicadors

7 Font (2005).

8 Lahosa and Molinas (2003).

9 Personal security and security of vehicles, homes, second residences, shops and businesses and agrarian economy.

10 IERMB (2009)

11 IERMB 2009.

12 See footnote 5.

13 Ponce (2010)